

THE RUSSIAN REVIEW



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Past and Present*

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THE RUSSIAN REVIEW

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The purpose of *The Russian Review* is to interpret the real aims and aspirations of the Russian people, as distinguished from and opposed to Soviet Communism, and to advance general knowledge of Russian culture, history and civilization. The Review invites contributions by authors of divergent views, but the opinions expressed in any individual article of this journal are not necessarily those of the editors.

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Paul Miliukov — Historian and Statesman

BY ALEXIS GOLDENWEISER

THE story of Russian liberalism is a neglected chapter of Russian history, and Miliukov's *Memoirs*, recently published by the Chekhov Publishing House in New York, present a rich source of information on this little-explored subject.¹ It is a remarkable book by a remarkable author. Miliukov, who was born in 1859 in Moscow and died in 1943 in exile in France, was one of the most prominent political personalities in Russia in the last two decades before the Revolution of 1917 and the recognized leader of Russian liberal groups. He was one of the greatest of Russian historians of his time and, moreover, was a prolific journalist who almost daily contributed editorials and articles on various subjects to those Russian newspapers of which he was the editor.

Miliukov begins his *Memoirs* with an apology for having taken the time to write them:

I am in my 82nd year. My friends have often insisted that I should write my memoirs, but I have always postponed this to the end of my life, when I would be no longer capable of doing anything else. Now many signs indicate that this end is approaching, and, moreover, circumstances have deprived me of the ability to continue my normal activities as a scholar and a journalist . . . Therefore, I feel no guilt in occupying my unwanted leisure with recollections of my own past. By so doing, I do not deprive anybody of anything.

Miliukov was, above all, a man of action, a worker of immense productivity and endurance. He had an insatiable thirst for knowledge. The *Memoirs* reveal a person of the greatest versatility, one with a power to absorb knowledge of any kind and a phenomenal memory. His vitality and intellectual power

¹P. N. Miliukov. *Vospominaniya (1859-1917)*. New York, Chekhov Publishing House, 1956. 2 vols. Vol. 1-438 pp., Vol. 2-397 pp. \$6.00.

remained intact to his last day. This extremely well-organized and well-written book was completed during his war-time exile in a small town in southern France, wholly from recollection, without the aid of books or other source material. It covers a period of over fifty years and gives detailed, factual, information on all the aspects of the author's many-sided life and work.

The son of a Moscow architect who died when he was still a boy, Miliukov, in his school years, had to earn his living by giving lessons. With little help from teachers, he acquired a thorough knowledge of Latin, Greek, and a number of modern languages so that in his later years he could write and lecture in French, English, and German. Intellectually, Miliukov was a self-made man. Although he went through the gymnasium and as a student of the Moscow University worked under the guidance of outstanding historians, such as Paul Vinogradov and V. O. Kluchevsky, he had the right to say in his *Memoirs*, concerning his education, that "for all I know I am indebted only to myself."

He was an amateur musician and to the last took time out to play the violin or the viola in chamber music performances. He was also an enthusiastic admirer of art. For example, he gives a detailed description of an Italian journey made in 1881, with meticulous enumeration of all the museums, churches, and monuments visited. As a young man Miliukov read the works of August Comte and Herbert Spencer, and for the rest of his life remained a positivist and agnostic, without much taste for metaphysical or theological quests into the "unknowable." In his political ideology he was by no means conservative and kept his mind open to the shifting trends of the times, but in his *Weltanschauung* he always remained a man of the nineteenth century.

Many-sided as were his scholarly interests, Miliukov, early in his student career, chose Russian history as his special field of study, and in spite of the fact that from about his fortieth year he became predominantly a politician and a political journalist, his contributions to Russian history make him one of the three or four greatest specialists in this field. In his work as a historian, Miliukov displayed a creative and original approach

not only as an explorer but also as a methodologist. In the *Memoirs* we read the following definition of his historical method:

Our generation decidedly rejected the concept of history as a narration of facts. We wanted to get rid of the high school method of presenting the geneology of kings, the dates of their reigns, their military victories and defeats, etc., as the chief content of history . . . We wished to see in the science of history something entirely different and somewhat approaching the methods of exact sciences. This demand was partly fulfilled by concentrating, not on the history of events, but on the history of the conditions of life and of institutions.

The most obvious "conditions" subject to such a study were economic conditions, and, far from being a Marxist philosophically and politically, Miliukov pays as much attention to economic developments as any adherent of "economic materialism."

This was the approach followed in Miliukov's first major historical work which he submitted as a thesis for the degree of "Master of Russian History." Its subject was "The Economic Policies of the Russian State in the First Half of the Eighteenth Century and the Reforms of Peter the Great."² It was a volume of 600 pages, of which a competent critic, Baron Boris Nolde, recently remarked: "All was original and new in this book, the source-material as well as the conclusions."³ Although the subject was a rather specialized one, the work dealt with a fundamental problem of interpretation of Russian history which had divided the two historical and political ideologies, the Slavophile and the Western. Miliukov was then and remained all his life emphatically on the side of the latter. "He envisaged Peter's reforms as a natural stage in the historic development of the Russian administrative and economic institutions."⁴ Published over sixty years ago, Miliukov's thesis remains to this day the most authoritative work on this subject.

²*Gosudarstvennoe khozyaistvo Rossii v pervoi polovine XVIII stoli-tiya i reforma Petra Velikovo*, 1892; 2nd ed. 1904.

³Boris Nolde, "L'oeuvre historique de P. Miljukov," *La Revue des Etudes Slaves*, v. 21, p. 150. (Paris, 1944).

⁴*Ibid.*

In the following decade (1893-1902) Miliukov published a number of articles and shorter books on Russian history and worked on his greatest historical effort, *Outlines of the History of Russian Culture*. This work, published in three volumes, was an immediate success and went through a number of editions from 1896 to 1917. In 1929, when Miliukov was in exile in Paris, the Bulgarian legislature presented him, on the occasion of his seventieth birthday, a grant which enabled him to publish a revised and substantially enlarged edition of this work. The indefatigable author found the time and the strength to present his old work in a completely new form. It consisted of five volumes of which four appeared in Paris between 1930 and 1937 and the last remained in manuscript.⁵

In his *Memoirs* Miliukov states that the general plan and method of his *Outlines* was conceived by the influence of Guizot's *The History of Civilization in France*.

Guizot [says Miliukov] makes the facts, selected and organized in their natural order, speak for themselves. The logic and inner significance of the events emerge spontaneously . . . seemingly without the interference of the historian . . . The history of institutions and the history of ideas have to be treated in parallel lines, revealing their interdependence and the natural order and inner causation of their evolution.

Thus history becomes not a narrative of events, but a study of sociological processes. In his *Outlines*, Miliukov successfully applies this method to the study of several aspects of Russian culture, from its origins to the present time.

The great success of the first edition of the *Outlines*, especially with the younger readers, was partly due to the fact that this book, while impeccable as to scholarship, had clearly discernable political overtones.

⁵*Ocherki po istorii Russkoi kultury*, Anniversary Edition, Paris, vol. I Part 1 (General Introduction, Geographical Data, The Cultural Beginnings, Origin of Nationalities); Vol. I Part 2 (Economy and Government, unpublished); Vol. II Part 1 (Religion, Church, Literature); Vol. II Part 2 (the Arts, the School, Education); Vol. III (Nationalities and Pro-Western Ideologies). English translation (condensed): *Outlines of Russian Culture*, edited by Michael Karpovich, translated by V. Ughet and E. Davis, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1942. 3 vols. The work has also been translated into French, German, and Czech.

Written under an autocratic regime [says Nolde] and under the strict control of a vigilant censorship, Miliukov's book in its conclusions, when properly deciphered, could only mean that the political and social evolution of Russia had an inherent trend towards the establishment of a constitutional and democratic regime. The historian speaks the language of the politician.⁶

In 1903, at the time when Miliukov published the last volume of the *Outlines*, he was already deeply absorbed in political activities. After his graduation in 1882, he became instructor in Russian history at the University of Moscow, but as early as 1895 his academic career was interrupted by a forced exile to the provincial town of Ryasan, imposed as retribution for his too-outspoken public lectures on political subjects. The next ten years were spent partly in exile, partly in travels abroad, and partly in Russian prisons. He continued to write on historical subjects but his main interests shifted to political activity.⁷

The road which he was to follow all his long political life was clearly discernible from his early youth. In 1876, when he was a boy of seventeen, he became a member of a clandestine association of students who met to discuss political problems. When a gang of hoodlums inflicted a severe beating on the group, Miliukov, as a spokesman for this association, wrote a letter to

⁶Nolde, *op. cit.*, pp.157-158.

⁷Besides the above-mentioned monumental works, Miliukov published the following historical works: *Trends of Russian Historical Thought* (*Glavnyia techeniia Russkoi istoricheskoi mysli*, 1897, Vol. I, 3rd ed. 1913), a critical analysis of the works of Karamzin and other Russian historians of the nineteenth century. *Iz istorii Russkoi intelligentsii* (1903), a collection of essays on various philosophical and sociological ideologies of the nineteenth century intelligentsia. Miliukov continued his work as a historian in exile. While living in a hideout in Moscow in the first months after the Bolshevik revolution, he wrote *History of the Second Russian Revolution* (*Istoriia vtoroi Russkoi revoliutsii*, published in 2 vols., in Kiev, in 1918 and later in Sofia in 1921). Written immediately after the events in which the author took a prominent part, this work does not pretend to be objective, but it contains much valuable information. As an exile in Paris, Miliukov wrote, in French, the major part of a three-volume *History of Russia* (*Histoire de Russie*, by P. Miliukov, Ch. Segnobos, and L. Eisenmann, Paris, 1932-33). In his last years, living in the South of France during the German occupation, he wrote for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace a history of Russian foreign policy from 1894 to 1942, ("From Nicholas II to Stalin," over 400 typewritten pages, *unpublished*).

Dostoevsky who was at that time the idol of a large segment of the Russian intelligentsia. The question he put to the famous writer was: "Are we guilty and what is our guilt?" Dostoevsky's answer was in line with his Slavophile and anti-Western ideas: he wrote that the Russian cultured classes were guilty towards their own people because they believed in ideologies imported from Western Europe. Miliukov and his group saw the reactionary implications of this point of view and were deeply disappointed by Dostoevsky's answer.

After the death of Alexander III, in 1894, the Russian intelligentsia became hopeful that his successor would follow a more liberal policy and would finally grant a constitution. Shortly thereafter Miliukov, in a course of public lectures in Nizhny-Novgorod, outlined to an enthusiastic audience, a historical sketch of the development of political thought in Russia, and, in conclusion, spoke of the future in an optimistic vein. Exile was then imposed, but later, upon his request, he was allowed to go abroad. When, in 1902, Peter Struve, acting as a delegate of a large group of Russian liberals, founded in Stuttgart, Germany, an illegal Russian weekly *Osvobozhdenie* (Liberation), Miliukov, writing under various pen-names, became a regular contributor to it. The magazine was smuggled into Russia and exercised a great influence upon public opinion.

In 1903, Miliukov visited the United States. Charles Crane invited him to deliver a series of lectures on Russia at the University of Chicago where the former had endowed annual courses on the history of Slavic peoples (the first lecturer was Masaryk who was to become the founder and first president of Czechoslovakia). In 1905 Miliukov's lectures were published by the Chicago University Press under the title *Russia and Its Crisis*.

The liberal upsurge of that year called Miliukov back to Russia. His political ideas of the period are thus described in the *Memoirs*:

My position must, in the first place, be defined negatively: I did not share the aspirations of the Russian socialist movements . . . I worked with the liberals and my own ideas were closer to their ideology. But as a guide to my political activity I considered Russian liberalism of that time as a vague and fluctuating trend with which

I by no means could identify myself. Moreover, my social ideas were much more definite than those of the liberals.

Miliukov's first task upon his return to Russia was to organize a liberal political party. It received the name of "Constitutional-Democratic Party," usually known under its abbreviated title "Cadet party." The party wanted a constitutional monarchy with a parliamentary regime, while the socialists wanted a republic to be proclaimed by a constitutional convention. By Miliukov's definition, the new party was to be "democratic," but not socialist. It was to attempt to "transmute political ideals into practically feasible demands by extracting from literary declarations what could be incorporated into a political platform."

As soon as the Cadet party was organized, most of the prominent representatives of the Russian intelligentsia, who were not affiliated with one of the socialist groups, joined its ranks. The core of its membership consisted of professors, lawyers, journalists and leading workers of the *Zemstvos* and municipalities, as well as liberal landowners and businessmen. In the elections to the First Duma, in 1906, the party won a brilliant victory. The Cadets became the majority party in the first Russian parliament and had to assume responsibility for its line of action.

Miliukov was not a member of the Duma because the administration did not recognize his domicile in St. Petersburg and struck his name from the list of voters. But, quipped a hostile newspaper, "he directed the Duma from the buffet-room." In fact, Miliukov visited the sessions daily and took a very active part in the deliberations of the party caucus. Moreover, as editor of the party newspaper, *Rech*, he formulated in his daily editorials the strategy and tactics of his party.

The dominant idea of the Cadet party and its leader was to make the Duma an organized and efficiently working legislative body, and not to let it become another revolutionary meeting place. In following this policy the Cadets had to struggle against a leftist opposition in the Duma itself (the Labor group and the socialists), and against extremist pressures of public opinion. But their main adversaries were, of course, a hostile monarch and a cabinet consisting of bureaucrats of the

old school. The Duma was dissolved after a 72-day session, and in a new election the rightists and leftists won more seats, thus making the position of Miliukov's party in the Second Duma still more difficult. Following the dissolution of the Second Duma, a new electoral law, issued by imperial decree on June 3, 1907, restricted the franchise and reinforced the position of the landowners and other population groups likely to vote for parties of the right.

In November, 1907, Miliukov was at last elected to the Third Duma, and in 1912, to the Fourth. In the beginning of his parliamentary activity, he was subject to violent attacks and even obstruction by the rightist majorities, but towards the end of the first session he forced the hostile majority to pay attention to his speeches. The seriousness of his approach to every problem and his vast knowledge and experience, especially in the field of foreign policy, had to be recognized, even by his numerous adversaries.

In his *Memoirs* Miliukov gives a vivid picture of his parliamentary activities and a valuable eye-witness account of all the political tribulations of the decade 1907-1917. He calls the last two years preceding the Revolution of 1917 the "culmination" of his political career. And it was during these years that he showed the true measure of his stature as a party leader and a statesman.

Paul Miliukov was, of course, neither the only nor the first of the Russian liberals who valiantly fought for the transformation of the Empire of the Tsars into a democratic state, governed by freely chosen representatives of the people. But while all the Russian liberals were sincere humanitarians, while many of them were idealists and some of them became martyrs to their convictions, Miliukov was undoubtedly the greatest, if not the only, Russian liberal who could act as a *statesman*. As a perennial opposition party, the liberals had become accustomed to identifying the ruling bureaucracy as the enemy which had to be defeated. While most of them were reluctant to embark on the path of a bloody revolution, few, if any, realized that the framework of the state and its government must be preserved even at the cost of their most cherished liberal ideals.

Miliukov most clearly showed his stature as a statesman by the position he assumed in times of crisis when the very existence of the Russian state was in danger—during the First World War and at the outset of the Revolution of 1917. He had always been an enemy of German militarism and of the policies of the old Austro-Hungarian empire. As a professor of the University of Sofia and a member of international commissions, he had frequently visited the Balkan countries. In 1914 he had, of course, the deepest sympathy for the struggle of the Serbs to preserve the independence of their state. Nevertheless, in the fatal weeks after the murder of Archduke Franz-Ferdinand on June 28, 1914, Miliukov, in his paper *Rech*, pleaded for moderation. He was for the localization of the Austro-Serbian war and against Russian interference. He considered the Russian interests not wholly identical with those of the Serbs and, furthermore, knew that Russia was not prepared for a major war which would inevitably lead to an all-European conflagration and, possibly, to disaster. These sober ideas were in conflict with the Slavophile trends in Russian society, even among many liberals, and were considered by the chauvinists of the Right and the militarists around the Minister of War, Sukhomlinov, to be just short of treason.⁸ Following this line in those ominous days, Miliukov showed independence and great courage.

As soon as war was declared, Miliukov assumed an ardently patriotic position. In his articles and speeches in the first year of the war he appealed for a political "armistice" on the internal front and for general support of an all-out war effort. But, in 1915, and especially in 1916, the situation changed. The Tsarist government appeared to be an unworthy partner in the "sacred union." It became evident that a change of the cabinet was necessary to assure good administration and competent military leadership. In the Duma this feeling was shared not only by the liberals and leftists but also by the parties of the moderate right. Miliukov became the organizer and chief spokesman of a large coalition of parties known as the "Progressive Bloc," which

⁸One of the first orders issued by the Grand Duke Nicholas after his appointment as Commander-in-Chief of the Russian armies, was the suspension of *Rech*. This suspension was revoked a few days later.

was wide enough to have a majority in the Duma. But the Tsar remained deaf to the demands of the representatives of the people, and revolution became inevitable.

When, in the first days of March, 1917, the Tsar abdicated in favor of his brother Michael, Miliukov, in a historic meeting of party leaders with the Grand Duke, desperately pleaded for his acceptance of the proffered crown. In the *Memoirs* he gives a dramatic picture of this meeting (which concurs with descriptions given by other participants⁹). The majority of the conferees, including members of the moderate right parties, advised the Grand Duke to refuse the offer and to vest the supreme power in a Provisional Government until the question "Monarchy or Republic?" would be finally decided by a Constituent Assembly.

Then came my turn to speak [writes Miliukov]. I said that a strong power was necessary for the implementation of the new political regime. The government can have such a power only if it can rely on a symbol which is familiar to the masses. The Provisional Government, lacking the support of such a symbol, simply will not survive until the opening day of the Constituent Assembly. It will be a frail boat which will sink in the ocean of popular disturbances. The country will be certain to lose entirely its state-consciousness and will fall into complete anarchy.

After a second round of speeches, Miliukov once more dramatically pleaded his case. Finally, the Grand Duke sided with the majority and declined to accept the supreme power.

In retrospect, the political realism of Miliukov's position in this historic debate is subject to doubt. It can be argued that although his forecast of the near future proved to be prophetic, it was already too late to stop the revolutionary tide. But Miliukov's plea undoubtedly shows that in 1917, as well as in 1914, he stood up as a statesman and a patriot and that he had the wisdom and the courage to plead for moderation.

When Grand Duke Michael announced his decision, Miliukov wanted to retire from the Provisional Government, but his close

⁹This conference and the part taken in it by Miliukov has been brilliantly described by one of the participants, V. V. Shulgin, in his book of reminiscences entitled *Dni*, Leningrad, 1927. pp. 237-248. See also Krensky's article "P. N. Miliukov" in *The New Review*, (a Russian Quarterly published in New York), vol. 5 pp. 335-336.

associates in the Cadet party persuaded him that it was his duty to remain and use all his authority within the councils of the government. However, his tenure of office as a Foreign Minister was very short. On May 2, 1917, he had to retire because of disagreements with his colleagues on the question of war aims, and in the following months, until October, he could exert his influence only as party leader and editor of his newspaper.

This last period of Miliukov's political activities in Russia is described in the closing chapter of the *Memoirs*. It remained unfinished; the published text ends with a description of the first Bolshevik uprising in July. According to the editors of the *Memoirs*, Professor M. M. Karpovich and Boris I. Elkin, the manuscript contained an additional 29 pages, bringing the story further, but it was only a rough draft which they considered inadvisable to publish.¹⁰

Miliukov's story of the first four months of the Revolution of 1917 is the last objective part of his *Memoirs*. It is a story of conflict with very keen, critical characterizations of all the leading actors in the unfolding drama. Miliukov as a politician was always a controversial figure, and his position in 1917 was sharply criticized at the time, and in subsequent years. But in his *Memoirs*, written thirty-five years after the revolution, Miliukov scarcely shows any changes of mind and makes no apologies.¹¹

In the field of foreign policy, Miliukov was criticized for championing "imperialistic" war aims and for not submitting to the popular slogan "Peace without annexations and indemnities." Most unpopular was his insistence on the Russian claims for the straits. This point is debatable, but it should not be forgotten that these claims were formally accepted by the Allies, and, in diplomacy as in business, it is hardly practical to renounce such

¹⁰The *Memoirs* do not cover Miliukov's life as a political exile (1918-1943). Most of it was spent in Paris, where he edited a daily newspaper (*Posledniya Novosti*), published the above-mentioned political works, and was the political leader of a large sector of the Russian emigration.

¹¹Marc Vishniak writes in his excellent review of the *Memoirs* that "Miliukov never liked to confess to any errors" and that in his book there are only a few minor exceptions to this habit. "After more than thirty years, Miliukov fully and absolutely defends all he had said and done in 1917." *The New Review*, New York, vol. 44, p.204.

claims in advance without any assurance of reciprocity.

In the field of domestic affairs, Miliukov's policy continued to be that of moderation, which, in a revolutionary atmosphere, was of course, extremely unpopular. He was emphatically opposed to the irresponsible slogan of the left, to "deepen the Revolution!" In his statesmanlike approach he understood that in wartime, when a high-g geared economy and an efficient administration were needed for the survival of the state, drastic social reforms were untimely and any slackening of governmental authority suicidal. It remains an open question whether, if Miliukov had his way, it would have been possible to avoid the impending disaster.¹²

Miliukov's failure in 1917 is a symbol of the tragic defeat of Russian liberalism by the revolutionary forces, following its short-lived triumph over the tsarist reaction. But notwithstanding this final defeat, his achievement in moulding liberal thought and directing the parliamentary struggle for a free and democratic Russia makes him an outstanding political figure in modern Russian history.

"I have nothing to be proud of," he writes in his *Memoirs*, "because in my political life there were more defeats than victories, and this was caused not only by unfavorable circumstances, but is also the result of my deliberately chosen political position. While I must now concede that my goal proved to be unattainable, I consider now, as I considered then, that I should not have chosen any other position."

¹²Marc Vishniak, in his above-mentioned article, expresses the opinion that if Miliukov were still a member of the Provisional Government in July, 1917, "it is possible that the crushing of the Bolshevik revolt would have been more thorough and the February regime could have lasted until the capitulation of Austria, Bulgaria and, finally, Germany" (*I.e.*, p.205). I would also like to quote the following lines from an obituary of Miliukov by Alexander Kerensky, who is the chief target of biting criticism in Miliukov's *Memoirs*:

"I know what P. N. Miliukov wanted in the critical moment of Russian history and am convinced that if P. N. Miliukov could have carried out his plan of Russia's revival and salvation, Russia would not have suffered her most terrible downfall since the Tartar yoke. And he could not achieve it only because the objective conditions in Russia of that time have made it an unrealistic dream." ("P. N. Miliukov," *The New Review*, vol. 5, p.329).

The Role of the Military in Recent Soviet Politics

BY RAYMOND L. GARTHOFF

THE death of Stalin ushered in a new era in Soviet history, and the military could not fail to be affected by the changes. But there have also been particular causes of a shift in the role of the military in Soviet affairs, increasing the political status and influence of the military leadership.

Bulganin reassumed the reunified Ministry of Defense in March, 1953, but the key development at that time was the public announcement that Marshal Zhukov was named a First Deputy Minister. Zhukov, removed from positions of responsibility in the High Command and from the public view in 1946, was returned to both high authority and prestige.

The second major event affecting the role of the military was the arrest of Beria and a number of the senior secret police generals. Quite aside from reported but unconfirmed direct assistance of the military in arresting Beria, the decline of the political police which followed Beria's fall inevitably compelled the political leaders to recognize the increased importance of the military as a major pillar supporting the regime. Moreover, the military was in evidence in the trials of Beria and other former leading police officials (Marshal Konev presiding at the trial of Beria). In the three months following Beria's arrest, the first postwar series of high-level promotions was made. In all, some ten senior generals, admirals, and marshals were promoted.

The third concrete manifestation of the increased standing of the military has been the decreased role of the political officers in the armed forces. This development had begun earlier, in 1951, when a secret decree re-emphasized the policy of unified command. But it was further developed and implemented in the period since Stalin's death. In particular, the

trend in favor of full command prerogatives for the professional officers has been accelerated under the regime of Bulganin and Khrushchev, due to the rise of Marshal Zhukov. The post of political officers at company level was abolished late in 1955. None of the political officers were elected to the Central Committee in February 1956 — in distinct contrast to the fact that in October, 1952, the three senior political officers had been elected to the previous Central Committee. Although the political administration has now decreased in stature, the Party organization in the armed forces, and the political officers are constantly urged to continue intensively political indoctrination. But the professional military leaders have clearly established their hegemony within the Ministry of Defense and the armed forces as a whole.

The second phase of the post-Stalin era in the Soviet Union was marked by the deposition of Malenkov and his replacement by Bulganin and Khrushchev in February, 1955. This event was the climax of a long struggle which even antedated the death of Stalin. But for our present purposes it is necessary only to trace certain elements of policy conflict which, in 1953 and 1954, led to the involvement of the military leaders in the political conflict. Simply on the professional and seemingly non-political basis of determining the military posture required by the needs of contemporary warfare, the military leaders found common ground with Khrushchev in opposing policies of Malenkov. Moreover, the disunity of the political leadership in effect weakened its ability to maintain the military in a subordinate position; instead, the military were wooed.

In his address to the Supreme Soviet on August 9, 1953, Premier Malenkov promised the introduction of a new economic policy of increased investment in consumer-goods industries. This policy did not become an open issue until late 1954, when Khrushchev opened a campaign for renewed emphasis on heavy industry. The military press enthusiastically supported this line, and following Malenkov's resignation, the military press and individual leading marshals reiterated frequently the theme introduced by the new Premier, Bulganin, that "heavy industry

is the foundation of the indestructible defense capability of the country."

A related issue which led to the dissatisfaction of the military with Malenkov's policies was his use of state reserves to accelerate the popular consumer program. Bulganin, in his "acceptance" address of February 9, 1955, reassured the military leadership by noting that: "Reserves comprise our might and strengthen the defense capability of the country," and even promising that "to increase the state reserves . . . is our most important task."

The third issue which found the military and Khrushchev's group in agreement was objection to Malenkov's possibly premature declaration of "mutual deterrence" in March, 1954. By declaring that a new thermonuclear war would lead to "the end of world civilization," Malenkov was tacitly recognizing a military stalemate. In April, 1954, Malenkov was compelled implicitly to retract his statement, and upon his resignation in February, 1955, Molotov sharply condemned the view that a war would lead to the destruction of world civilization. In fact, no real disagreement on the estimate of the situation may ever have existed, but the propaganda effect of Malenkov's statement tended to suggest to the people the lack of danger of war. Khrushchev and the military did not wish to see this picture presented in the way Malenkov did, nor for the purposes of reducing expenditures on heavy industry and defense.

Finally, the issue which probably most alarmed the military leaders was the reduction in military appropriations. Budgetary allotments and actual expenditures declined in 1953 and 1954. Moreover, Malenkov (and such chief lieutenants as Pervukhin and Saburov) pointedly failed to call for strengthening the armed forces in their March, 1954, Supreme Soviet "election" speeches — in contrast to usual procedure and to the speeches of Khrushchev, Bulganin, and others. Again, Malenkov and his associates were compelled to abandon their stand in public addresses in April. Saburov restated the "Malenkov position" in the anniversary of the Revolution speech on November 6, 1954, in which he neglected to call attention to military strength. But the challenge did not go unanswered. On the very next day

Bulganin called for strengthening defense capability. And in the Supreme Soviet session which saw Malenkov's ouster, the military budget was increased by over twelve per cent.

Following the victory of the Khrushchev-Bulganin group over Malenkov in February, 1955, the military received a series of rewards. First, Marshal Zhukov replaced Bulganin as Minister of Defense, as the latter shed the use of the uniform and title of a Marshal of the Soviet Union to become Premier. A month later, twelve marshals and generals were promoted, including six to the highest rank of Marshal of the Soviet Union. Later in the year, at least six more generals were promoted to the rank of General of the Army. In general, the political standing of the military was inevitably strengthened as a result of their political involvement and Malenkov's defeat.

Soon after the advent of the new regime, however, a period of intensive maneuvering began among certain of the military leaders. It is quite likely that Khrushchev himself wished to build up certain other military men to counterbalance Zhukov's new influence and prestige. If not, then at least some of the military men themselves sought to cultivate the favor of Khrushchev. The major figure in these maneuverings has been Marshal Konev. He, together with Marshal Moskalenko and some of the senior political officers, have aligned themselves with Khrushchev. In contrast, Marshal Zhukov and most of the military leaders have sought to remain aloof from factional political alignment in the period since Malenkov's deposition as premier.

One element of maneuver was a bid by Khrushchev to have history so rewritten that he would be presented as a war hero. The campaign to emphasize the military role of Khrushchev (who had served as a military commissar, a lieutenant-general in the political administration) was conducted by mentioning his name and that of a few other selected political figures, as having been sent by the Party "to the front" in the war. This particular formulation was selected presumably because it easily permitted the omission of such men as Malenkov and Mikoyan from the listing, while Khrushchev and Bulganin were in the initial listings, the only living men listed (the others then mentioned were Zhdanov and Shcherbakov). The articles

in question first appeared in the spring of 1954 and again in December of that year, both in political and military press organs and monographs. In February, 1955, with Khrushchev's victory over Malenkov, a flurry of such listings appeared, and the first senior professional officer employed this theme — Marshal Konev. Moreover, Konev significantly altered the previously standard listing to give precedence to the name of Khrushchev. Again in May, 1955, in articles commemorating the tenth anniversary of victory, a number of these listings appeared. Again Konev and also Colonel General Zheltov (head of the Chief Political Administration) listed Khrushchev's name first and also added Voroshilov and Kaganovich after Bulganin's name. But of the twenty key articles by military men on this occasion, only two other marshals — Bagramian and Chuiikov — and two lesser political officers, mentioned the war role of political leaders at all. All of the other professional military leaders (including Marshals Zhukov, Vasilevsky, Sokolovsky, Biriuzov, and Admiral of the Fleet Kuznetsov) studiously avoided reference to any living political figures.

Other signs of Khrushchev's attempt to be established retroactively as a war leader were references to his role at the battle of Stalingrad and as one of "Lenin's associates" in the Civil War. In both cases, history has been edited to raise his role and to exclude the role of certain others, in particular Malenkov. Again, the marshals have all failed to contribute to this campaign. In general, since mid-1955 Khrushchev's campaign for retroactive achievement of military glory has not advanced far.

Another element of maneuver among the military leaders has followed the attempts to restore the credit due to military leaders for their wartime role. With the death of Stalin and the improvement of the status of the military, the restoration of due historic credit has begun. But precisely because it is a matter of history, it has become one of politics. For, as has often been observed, in the Soviet Union history is indeed the projection of the present into the past. Marshals Zhukov, Konev, Vasilevsky, and Rokossovsky have gained most in prestige to date. Of particular interest was an abortive attempt in June,

1955, to usurp the glory of the victorious battle of Berlin for Konev from its true hero, Marshal Zhukov.

The relative standing of the serious military leaders can be readily inferred from the relatively frequent order of appearance of their names at official receptions and in official listings. Under Marshal Bulganin's administration of the Ministry of Defense in 1953 and 1954, he was followed by Vasilevsky, Zhukov, Sokolovsky, and Konev, in that order. In February, 1955, when Marshal Zhukov replaced Bulganin, the listing became Zhukov, Vasilevsky, Konev, and Sokolovsky. The present list reads: Zhukov, Konev, Vasilevsky, Sokolovsky, and Malinovsky.

In the spring of 1955, and again in mid-1956, Konev's standing rose. For example, Konev was singled out for the striking honor of making the key speech on the tenth anniversary of the victory over Germany on May 8, 1955. While an article by Zhukov appeared in *Pravda* on that same date, Konev's speech was published both in *Pravda* and *Red Star* and was accompanied by his photograph, an honor seldom rendered to a military figure. Again, Marshal Konev's further rise, in June, 1956, was marked by his promotion from one of a dozen deputy ministers to the post of First Deputy Minister for General Affairs, replacing Vasilevsky on the latter's retirement from an active position in the ministry.

In analyzing the rise of Marshals Zhukov and Konev, the political significance of their respective standings and those of other senior military leaders, it is necessary to look back at least to the period at the end of World War II. In early 1946, Marshal Zhukov, by far the most outstanding Soviet military leader, was suddenly removed from his position as Deputy Minister of Defense and Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces and sent to command a secondary military district. His replacement was Marshal Konev. In late 1952, Zhukov again secretly replaced Konev, whose turn it now was to be sent to command a minor military district. Marshal Sokolovsky (Zhukov's loyal chief of staff during much of the war) replaced General Shtemenko as Chief of the General Staff at this time. But also in these obscure days immediately preceding Stalin's

death the alleged "doctors' plot" was revealed, in January, 1953. The announced prospective victims were all military men (and the two claimed real victims, Zhdanov and Shcherbakov, although primarily political figures, had during the war held military rank). But the selection of "hero-victims designate" in the plot was particularly revealing. Marshals Konev, Govorov, and Vasilevsky, General Shtemenko, and Admiral Levchenko were listed, but the names of Marshals Zhukov and Sokolovsky, and Admiral Kuznetsov were conspicuous by their absence.

The evidence — despite inferences from Khrushchev's secret speech of February, 1956, devaluating Stalin — is very strong that Khrushchev was behind the doctors' plot announcement. And this was neither the first nor the last association of Konev with Khrushchev. During the war, Khrushchev served for a time as political officer with Marshal Konev in the First Ukrainian Front. Konev later served as chairman of the military tribunal which sentenced Beria to death, and at which another Khrushchev associate, Mikhailov, returned the indictment. Moreover, as we have noted, Konev has lent his support to the effort to build Khrushchev's military reputation, and has repeated other themes favored by Khrushchev.

In addition to the fluctuations in standing and ultimate rise both of Marshals Zhukov and Konev, other senior military leaders have been affected by political developments. The most significant index of political standing among the senior military chiefs is representation on the Central Committee of the Communist Party. The current Committee was elected in February, 1956, and includes, of the professional military leaders, six full and twelve candidate members. (In addition, there are Marshals Bulganin and Voroshilov, a number of political leaders who had held wartime general's rank, and six defense production specialists with general's rank.) This representation marked a decrease of eight in the number of professional officers from the Central Committee elected in October, 1952. Marshal Zhukov, elected only a candidate member in 1952, had been raised to full membership by the same plenum which sanctioned Beria's arrest. He, together with Marshals Konev, Vasilevsky, and Sokolovsky, remained full members, and Marshals Moska-

lenko and Malinovsky also became full members in February, 1956. Admiral of the Fleet Kuzentsov, who had been a full member since 1939, was not re-elected. Among the candidates not re-elected in 1956 were the two senior political officers, and no political officers are currently represented. The air force and navy are each represented only by their current commanders-in-chief as candidate members, a moderate decline in representation for both services.

The most significant political implication of the new military representation on the Central Committee is the apparent selection of men "acceptable" to Khrushchev, including in a few instances loyal supporters of his faction. The most blatant example is the election of Marshal Moskalenko as a new full member, who was only a colonel general and not even a candidate member in 1952. Moskalenko, promoted both in 1953 and 1955, has served since Beria's arrest as commander of the crucial Moscow Military District. He was associated with Khrushchev in the First Ukrainian Front in 1944, in the Ukraine from 1945 to 1949, and again in the Moscow Party Committee from 1949 to 1951. Finally, he too—with Marshal Konev—served on the military tribunal which sentenced Beria. A number of other marshals elected to candidate membership in 1956, while presumably not committed to Khrushchev as are Konev and Moskalenko, have had past association with Khrushchev: Marshals Bagramian, Chuikov, Grechko, Biriuzov, and Yeremenko (the latter two raised to this post for the first time). All of these men had been promoted in 1953-1955. It would not, however, be correct to consider these marshals as necessarily "Khrushchev men"—they are merely known quantities to him, and as such considered acceptable.

The major political power of the military men is, of course, Marshal Zhukov—first professional military man to reach the level of candidate member of the Presidium (Politburo). The favoring of such marshals as those named earlier, and above all of Marshal Konev, is probably Khrushchev's way of insuring that Zhukov's power will not be totally unchecked even within the Ministry of Defense. Thus while Marshal Zhukov has been powerful enough to become a political figure, Khrushchev has

sought to establish limits to this power by building up other military men not too closely associated with Zhukov.

One final indication of the recent and current role of the military in Soviet politics can be found in Khrushchev's famous secret speech of February 25, 1956. Not only did Khrushchev demolish the myth of Stalin's military "genius," he also praised the military commanders. In particular, he presented himself as Zhukov's loyal friend and defender against Stalin's hints that Zhukov was not a good soldier. (Marshal Vasilevsky, now retired, and Malenkov, now demoted in prestige, are on the contrary presented as close to Stalin and unable or unwilling to argue with him.)

There are indications that as early as the fall of 1953 the military had sought a devaluation of the inflated image of Stalin's military role. And, in 1955 and especially in 1956, there had begun a revision of the military history of the last war which affects even current military doctrine. The military leaders have thus favored and sought a devaluation of Stalin's military role to facilitate certain developments in military thought, as well as to recover due prestige denied to them by Stalin. But while Khrushchev sought to please the military by including several thrusts at Stalin's military shadow, it would be incorrect to assert (as some have done) that the military had "forced" Khrushchev to downgrade Stalin. The major causes of the "downgrading" of Stalin were related to political issues and not to pressure from the military.

In summarizing the current political role of the military, and in speculating on their future role, several points should be emphasized. First, the military have, whether with enthusiasm or with reluctance, become a political force. The death of the all-powerful autocrat was the major cause. The arrest of Beria and sharp reduction of the role of the secret police was the second step. And, finally, the very nature of the issues which arose between the factions of the political leadership drew them into important, even if passive, political action. The military leaders, having contributed to Malenkov's fall, have "known sin" in a way that has not been true at least since the days of Tukhachevsky. But the alliance with the faction of Khrushchev

was born of certain policy issues and may not continue if Khrushchev's policies veer away from those of the military on key defense issues. On the other hand, the military leadership is divided, with Marshals Zhukov and Sokolovsky representing the uncommitted majority, and Marshals Konev and Moskalenko representing those at least partly committed to Khrushchev. Having come to power in part through the support of the military, Khrushchev wishes to obviate the need for continued dependence on them in the future. While the future course of the political role of the military cannot be foretold, it clearly will be substantial. But if the political leaders engage in conflict, and particularly if issues which directly affect military requirements should again arise, the military may even be forced—or, if indeed they have political ambition, given the opportunity — to become active contestants for power.

Sholokhov and Tolstoy

BY HELEN MUCHNIC

COMPARISONS between Sholokhov and Tolstoy are often made. *The Quiet Don* is referred to as the Soviet *War and Peace*, of which it seems to celebrate the centenary; *War and Peace* begins in the summer of 1805 and closes in 1820, and *The Quiet Don* begins in the summer of 1912 and ends in 1920. Although these dates are, of course, imposed by history rather than by artistic design, Tolstoy is always in the background. *The Quiet Don* is full of stylistic and structural echoes of *War and Peace*; and once, in the diary of a young Cossack, Tolstoy is explicitly mentioned. The young Cossack is slain by the Germans, and the slim notebook, a record of the last five months of his short life, is found on his body by Gregory Melekhov, the central character of the novel. This happens in an episode—omitted in the English translation—which, though but tenuously related to the plot, has a meaning that reaches back, beyond its place in the story, to something fundamental.

The soldier's writing is heartfelt, but derivative. His bookish style is as pathetic as his brief life; its careful language as alien to his native Cossack speech as he himself had been cut off in Moscow from his home on the Don. His literary manner, borrowed from Tolstoy, is a contemplative retreat. Out of it, at a distance, he looks at the events he lives through. Sholokhov has no doubt meant it to be a pitying satire on the archaic, clouded vision of the "cultivated" man. The young Cossack has not known how to see with his own eyes. He has looked through those of the author he admired, has written the kind of thing that would interest the friend for whose eyes he has intended his diary, has made piously commonplace remarks. His version of battle, examined through a haze of "literature," is a step removed from what actually takes place. And the experience of Nicholas Rostov, which he invokes, is not at all like his own, while Gregory Melekhov's is still more different. Gregory's

experience in battle, like Rostov's and unlike the unknown Cossack's, is immediate and individual. It is primarily the experience of shock, and it is not involved in moralizing. But, like the Cossack's and unlike Rostov's, it is precise in detail and the effect it creates is not so much of pathos as of horror. Even when Gregory sees things in a haze, it is not his vague impressions we are given but the exact image of what he himself has not seen clearly. The effect is pictorial and sensuous, for we are not identified with the character; we are observers of a scene of which he is himself a part. This is sensationalism in both the current and the root meaning of the word. And it is a trait peculiar to Sholokhov, who points things out to make us shudder, a method that indicates not only stylistic but philosophical and psychological differences between him and Tolstoy.

Tolstoy's realism was the result of skilled analysis; his simplicity was the height of sophistication. He studied the world with the same uncompromising severity with which he looked into himself; he understood others through self-knowledge, and his writing was an attempt to define himself in relation to others and to his world. It was a deep but troubled introspectiveness that made his greatness, and his finest creations project the problem by which he was always tormented: how to preserve the precious insights of intuition and curb an inveterate impulse to dissect, which seemed to him destructive. His celebrated method of *otstranenie*, of "making things strange," of seeing everything, that is, as if it had never been seen before, depended on this acute self-awareness; his work, however realistic in effect, is in essence subjective, and always speculative. That is why the world of his novels appears through the eyes of men and women who approach it with the notions and interests characteristic of their personalities. Like Tolstoy himself, they have questions to ask of life. They come to it with certain expectations, and the meaning of their experience lies in the interaction between what they anticipate and what the world presents. Thus, Rostov, galloping into battle, has preconceived notions of what a battle should be and expectations of the part he is to play in it. This is also true of the older and wiser Andrey Bolkonsky, and even of the absent-minded Pierre Bez-

ukhov, who wanders through life in the same abstracted way in which he strays on to the field of Borodino, his thoughts entangled in enormous problems that he always yearns to solve. To Tolstoy's men and women, action and sensuous perceptions are a testing ground of ideas; all that happens physically corroborates ideas or perturbs the mind. For Sholokhov the opposite is true. Occurrences in the physical realm are primary and most important. The mind, like the body, reacts automatically to the blows that overwhelm it. The senses are not subordinate to the imagination. Meaning and value reside in the physical world, and little exists beyond the evidence of sight, hearing, taste, smell, touch. Gregory, to be sure, is confronted by ideas and vacillates between doctrines, but these are for him no different than events in the physical world. He is mentally unprepared for what he will have to live through; and everything—battles, ideas, even love—descend on him with the force of sudden, shattering collisions. Everything comes as shock, not the shock of disillusionment, but that of surprise. Nothing has been foreseen, and Gregory is darkly driven through a nightmare of the unexpected.

It is, then, in the realm of consciousness, in the role of the mind's debate with itself, that one detects the basic difference between Tolstoy's realism and Sholokhov's. Sholokhov seems to have no quarrel with himself, and the disharmony one notices in his work does not appear to have engaged his consciousness. He has neither the habit nor the need to look inward; he does not have to fight his mind; his work proceeds from a kind of unobtrusive solidity, a calm self-assuredness. He is a chronicler of events and is not identified with any of his characters, as Tolstoy is, for example, with his Pierre Bezukhov or his Andrey Bolkonsky. Sure of himself, untroubled in his relations with others, Sholokhov is not an actor in the drama but an invisible, sympathetic member of the group he writes about. Reflectiveness is alien to him, perhaps even distasteful. He ascribes it to such men as his pathetic young diarist, whom he does not know well nor care to know better, or to his tragically mistaken Gregory whose puzzled and unproductive oscillation between schemes of belief can hardly be called "thinking." Such men

Sholokhov either pities or despises; they are out of touch with the true and the real. But even those he admires, his Communist leaders, do not wrestle with the ideas they inculcate; their "thinking" is a ready acceptance of a philosophy, the rightness of which they take to be self-evident. Nor is it ever suggested that thought might involve anything more than the adoption of ready-made doctrines, or that discussion can be anything other than a violent clash of opinions. For the most part, his characters act without inward strife. Their choices are predetermined by habit, tradition, or unwavering prejudice. No room is left for individual interpretation; there is no examination of principles, there is only a well defined "truth" on the one hand, and on the other, that which lies outside it and is therefore false. Reason can add nothing to the prescriptions of doctrine, and he who hesitates is lost indeed. It is remarkable, when one thinks of it, that a story which is concerned with nothing less than a radical revaluation of traditional concepts, symbolized in a man whose fate hinges on the choices he makes among ideas—that in a story of this kind there should be nothing of that poetry and passion of debate which one finds in *War and Peace*, not to speak of Dostoevsky's novels. But, of course, this is consistent with a view that pre-supposes truth to be limited and incontrovertible, and the selection of beliefs, therefore, to be not an intellectual but a moral act.

What are Gregory's convictions in the end? To what state of mind and feeling have his thoughts and passions brought him? This is not clear, nor does it matter. What a man does and what happens to him is more interesting than what happens within him. The only criterion by which he can be fairly judged is the role he has played in society. By this standard Gregory has been proved guilty. His doom, like that of every tragic hero, reflects the nature of his guilt. If justice demands that the punishment of Oedipus' inward crime be self-inflicted, so that the form it takes, the blinding, the exile, become physical manifestations of a spiritual flaw; if Ivan Karamazov's error of the mind is paid for by the mind, and his brother Mitya's sin of passion can be redeemed only by his emotions, so Gregory's political fault is punished by society. Like the pagans of

Dante's limbo, Gregory is pitiful and wrong, excluded from Utopia which he has not had the foresight to revere. But where else in epic or romance does the victory of a group overshadow so completely the defeat of an individual? In *The Iliad* the moral triumph of Achilles surpasses the military triumph of the Greeks, and the grandeur of Hector ennoble the Trojans; in *The Aeneid* the destiny of an empire hangs on the fortunes of one man; in *The Song of Roland* a single champion restores his France to honor; in *The Lay of Igor's Armament* a hero's escape from captivity is the climax of his nation's fate; in *War and Peace* the spiritual growth of Pierre Bezukhov and Andrey Bolonsky is no less important than the defeat of Napoleon; and in medieval lives of saints, a man's martyrdom in this world is but a means of eternal salvation. At all times, the fate of individuals has been the focus of interest. Now this fate is shown as unimportant. It is the group that matters; the ideal man is the social servant; and the willful individual, condemned in Gregory, is thoroughly denounced. His failure is complete and without compensation, and all that made him unique is damned: passion, rebelliousness, pride, the will to put principles to the test and to change allegiance as conscience may exact. In a moral order that takes discipline and submissiveness to be the highest virtues, sympathy for a man like Gregory, who hesitates at the crossroads, cannot be allowed. And one can only marvel at the rapidity with which in a revolutionary epoch the ideal of revolt has been suppressed.

Gregory stirs our pity but does not move the reason; his passionate life, twisting in tangled and devious ways, leads nowhere beyond itself. And yet, as a representative of the old order, he might have been a Great Antagonist, a Satan, a Prometheus, or at least an Iago. But Sholokhov's scheme demands that the undistinguished be praised. His Gregory is not, and could not be, permitted to dazzle. The brilliance of Milton's Satan makes God's creation and even God himself seem dull, Iago has a depth of pettiness worthy of Othello's largeness. There is greatness in their evil, but for Sholokhov the unique must be conceived as small; Gregory's rebellion must appear pitiable, and the virtues of his opposite number, Mishka Kosh-

evoy, must be the kind of which most men are capable. Grandeur belongs to the masses, and the only individuals in whom it can be embodied are those who have understood the laws of historical necessity and ordered their lives accordingly. In this again we find a sharp contrast to Tolstoy, who, while pleased to debunk "greatness," counterbalanced his caricature of Napoleon by his paean to Kutuzov and his praise of Pierre, showing humbleness and simplicity to be magnificent, and thus changing the concept of grandeur without relinquishing it. But Sholokhov levels, or refutes, the admiration he arouses; his Communist heroes—such as Bunchuk, the account of whose love of Anna Pogudko is one of the most touching passages in the novel, or Podtelkov, whose execution is memorably harrowing—are either piteous or obscured by the horror of their fate, and the ideal Mishka, with all his pleasant boyishness and stoic virtues, turns out to be a prig and a bore. Tolstoy knew how to make the commonplace poetic, Sholokhov can only sentimentalize it. His real heroes, as a matter of fact, are not living characters at all, but idols: Marx, Lenin, and Stalin, who do not appear in his books, but are spoken of and quoted with reverence.

It is not by virtue of an ideal that Sholokhov holds us entranced, but by the passion of his men and women, by his vigorous love of the land, and by the sheer fascination of horror. The love story of Gregory and Aksinia is as powerful as any love story of romantic legend. It has no "meaning" as Tolstoy's love stories have meaning; it stands by itself, overwhelming and complete. It is the glory of the book. Nowhere does Sholokhov's gift appear more clearly, nowhere else does one see so well how feeling may be shown pictorially—compact, unanalyzed—in the graphic utterance of actions and gestures. It is an earthy love. And the whole book is earthy; it feels and smells of the soil. The seasons here are the time piece by which the fortunes of individuals and history itself are clocked. Men are attached to the earth physically and emotionally, and the setting of their lives is never forgotten.

Indeed, *The Quiet Don* shares the characteristic qualities of the primitive epic. It is lyric, objective, and devout: lyric in

that it is not analytic and is filled with enthusiasm about life, objective in that the author is not identified with any of his characters and takes no part in the action, devout in that it is dedicated to an unquestioned faith. But lyricism, objectivity, and devotion differ in direction and degree in accordance with variations in the nature of the beliefs to which they are given.

Sholokhov's view of man is lyrical, his feeling about the land is sensuous and personal, and there is so much good-natured tolerance at bottom that even his condemnation of men is tinged with kindness. He does not seem to belong to an age of anxiety. But he writes in an age of total horror for people whose imagination, fed on anguish, has grown insatiable. His audience, the men and women of the twentieth century, have not only been inured to pain but have developed a craving to witness it, and he does not blink at the suffering that all have known either directly or vicariously. Tolstoy's work belonged, if not to a gentler era, at least to one in which extreme brutality was not habitual. When pain occurs in *War and Peace* it is poignant and appealing; the work is not saturated in physical torment. To Sholokhov, wounds, convulsions, death throes, self-inflicted mutilations are the order of the day, and he records them minutely. Not callously, however, convinced as he is that in the outcome all misery will be redeemed. He is optimistic because his goal is sure, and because there is nothing imponderable in his view of life. This is not the same as Tolstoy's happiness, nor Homer's. Tolstoy's morality was, in essence, hedonistic. Happiness was his theme, and happiness not as a future possibility, a social goal, but as an actuality, the purpose and standard of life. Homer's delight was in the moral strength of men and their physical vigor and joy in living. But Sholokhov is pleased and hopeful because men know how to endure. There is a greater sense of loss and pity in *The Iliad* than in *The Quiet Don*, and a greater reticence. When Homer pauses to describe a wound, his description has little to do with suffering; the wound is almost independent of the wounded man:

With this he hurled his spear, and Athene guided it on to Pandarus' nose near the eye. It went crashing among his white teeth. The bronze point cut through the root of his tongue, coming out

under his chin, and his glistening armor rang rattling round him as he fell heavily to the ground. The horses started aside for fear, and he was reft of life and strength.

It is not suffering but death that Homer emphasizes, and he is full of pity: young men fall "like high pine trees to the ground," their bright armor rattles round them, their death destroys their parents' hopes for them, where "many Trojans and Achaeans" lie "stretched side by side face downwards upon the earth." Homer grieves for unfulfillment, for the loss of those who should still have lived; to Tolstoy physical suffering is sometimes a revelation of personality or a means to spiritual discovery; to Dante, that poet of torment, suffering is a moral symbol, an instrument of divine justice. Only in our day and age does physical agony seem to have become important in itself.

This is in keeping with a materialistic, pragmatic view of life. Sholokhov does not venture outside the bounds of his observation into a realm of meanings. His work could not be summed up, as *War and Peace* is summed up in the conclusions to which Pierre and Andrey ultimately arrive, taught by experiences of love and death. Gregory's love shows him nothing except his strength, and death and suffering soon become too habitual to teach a lesson. Because Sholokhov's people approach the world without preconceptions, they meet it without wonder, and are driven but do not learn. As the years of horror pile up, those who are not killed grow hard; the fit are callous. What Santayana once called "the blind tendency of action" is Sholokhov's concern. History itself is no more to him than a clearly perceptible march of events, the meaning of which is immediate, specific, unequivocal. Events are what they are, accurately recorded in official documents and in the impressions of those involved in them. Such intricate problems as the nature of consciousness in its relation to brute fact, as the possibility of the mind's fully knowing any occurrence whatsoever, which led Tolstoy to his concept of history as a murky window on elusive truth, must be foreign to a convinced Marxist. Tolstoy took nothing for granted, and when he propounded a philosophy, he was also announcing a discovery. But Sholokhov's doctrine is not his own. He is not a discoverer in the realm of

thought but a missionary among missionaries, seeking not so much to explain as to impose an idea, the validity of which he believes to have been proved in action. *War and Peace* and *The Iliad* are more than tales of how the Russians conquered Napoleon and the Greeks the Trojans: these historic moments are part of an ampler theme, and through them we enter that realm of the imagination in which a poet can speak to all men in all times. But *The Quiet Don* is the story of how the Reds defeated the Whites, and neither pretends nor aspires to be anything more. Sholokhov stands firmly on the ground by the Don, and we remain there with him, unprovoked and uninvited to venture beyond. But what strikes us is that the fine descriptions to which we are treated, the vivid dramatic scenes, the sketches of men and women, the racy conversations, are all slices of life rather than full experiences, broken pieces, as it were, unrelated and irrelevant to the central thought. They have come from the depths, but have been flung aside and, unlike the episodes of *War and Peace* or *The Iliad*, are not borne on the current of the spontaneous delight which inspired them. For the current has been deflected, the stream has been diffused and has run aground. A formidable dam of rigid principles has blocked its flow.

Sholokhov has sung the legend of an age. And although his theme of War and Revolution is common among Soviet writers, there is no other work like *The Quiet Don*. His voice is unique. A voice that seems to sing unwaveringly of a loved country and a cherished faith, it has the ring of certitude. Nevertheless, one is disturbed by something like a quaver in it, a deep seated discrepancy between conviction and emotion, which is nowhere openly expressed and of which the author himself is doubtless unaware. Sholokhov's pragmatism colors his whole work. It is a philosophy that can, and does, demand that an individual do violence to himself if the communal good demands this of him, commit acts that he finds deeply repulsive, school himself to ruthlessness, learn to murder as a duty and extol his murders as right. We know we should admire Mishka Koshevoy. And yet, when he lords it over Gregory in a way we are meant to applaud, he offends our aesthetic perceptions as well as our

moral sense. Something, one feels, is wrong here. Something has been twisted or left out. It has been Sholokhov's romanticism that moved us, and his voice, in spite of all the horrors it recited, has sounded very kind. How could he end by praising callousness? Mediocrity he could praise: he seems a man to suffer fools gladly. Brutality, too, as a tragic necessity to which a man must steel himself at times: he is a stoic. But brutality as such, brutality in itself—no! Yet here is Mishka, who performs too easily and gladly what his position demands. Gregory is to him not a person but an enemy, and although they had been boyhood friends, he has no qualms in sending him to death. Enemies must be destroyed. Is this Sholokhov speaking? One's sympathy remains with Gregory, who had not been able to school himself to inhumanity. And one wonders. Is Sholokhov's voice quite as self-assured as it has seemed? The quaver one detects in it argues something discordant and unbalanced, as if its cadences and timbre were inappropriate to his theme. Is it, perhaps, that artistic inspiration and civil duty have not been fully integrated here, and that for this reason his finest achievement is the portrait of a man he condemns? Gregory, we are given to understand, has been forced to suppress qualities that would have made him a valuable member of the Communist Party; only in the world of Communism could his generosity, directness, and integrity have been fully expressed and appreciated. And the question suddenly presents itself: is not Gregory, unintentionally, a portrait of his creator in reverse, Sholokhov, the Party man, who in the ardor of his belief has lost more than he knows, whose romantic appreciation of life, which verges on the sentimental, his native easy-going kindness, have been inhibited by his allegiance to a cause that imposes the terrible obligation of preaching hatred? The unintended ascendancy of the rebellious and defeated Gregory over the pious and victorious Mishka may be, then, a demonstration that sometimes, in defiance of the artist's will but by virtue of his nature, art and humanism can triumph over dogma.

The Russian Revolution and Wilson's Far-Eastern Policy

BY BETTY MILLER UNTERBERGER

THE Russian revolutions of 1917 had significant repercussions in the Far East as well as in Europe. The political vacuum in Siberia and North Manchuria created by the revolutions led to an Allied military intervention which became the most important phase of American foreign policy in the Far East during and immediately following World War I. The policy of intervention, adopted by the United States primarily as a means of preserving the open door in the Russian Far East and Manchuria, introduced America's greatest offensive against Japanese expansion prior to World War II.

During the first six months of 1918, President Wilson was besieged with appeals for military intervention in Siberia. They came from many sources, from his Allies, from the Supreme War Council, from his own diplomatic staff abroad. The Allies feared that the military supplies gathered in Vladivostok for the Russian prosecution of the war would fall into the hands of the Germans once the Bolsheviks secured control of Siberia. Moreover, as Siberia seemed to be the ideal spot for mobilizing the anti-German elements in Russia, the Allies early considered the possibility of sending an expeditionary force to Siberia to rally these elements to renew the fight against Germany. After the Russo-German peace negotiations at Brest-Litovsk neared their conclusion in March, 1918, and the Germans proceeded to withdraw an increasing number of troops from their Russian front, Britain and France increased their appeals for intervention. Although personally opposed to such an intervention, Wilson found it difficult to resist the pressure from his Allies. Thus he was faced with one of the most perplexing problems of his career.

In early January, Great Britain proposed that Japan be invited as the mandatory of the Allies to occupy the Trans-Siberian

railway. The President promptly rejected this scheme.¹ The imperialistic Japanese program of 1914-1917 led him to believe that the Japanese themselves had originated the plan for invading Siberia, and that they wished the expedition to be exclusively Japanese in order to secure control of the Maritime Province. Wilson intended to prevent such a development.² Said Wilson, "it seems . . . unwise to make a request which would in itself give the Japanese a certain moral advantage with respect to any ultimate desires or purposes she may have with regard to the eastern provinces of Siberia."³ To additional proposals for Japanese intervention, Wilson repeated his opposition.

In July, 1918, in the face of new and compelling circumstances, Wilson changed his mind. He not only agreed to intervention but took the lead in inviting the Japanese to a limited joint intervention in Siberia. His avowed reasons were to "rescue" some 70,000 Czechoslovaks allegedly attacked in Siberia by Bolsheviks and Austro-German war prisoners and to aid the Russian people in any efforts at self-government they might desire.⁴

Although the much publicized plight of the Czechs in Siberia gave Wilson the necessary "moral" reason for intervention, the number of troops proposed for rescuing 70,000 Czechs was ludicrously small, and by the time the United States took action for their safety they had already been in possession of important points on the Trans-Siberian railway for some two months. Wilson's second objective was subject to confused and varied interpretation, since he failed to say which Russians the American troops were to aid in their efforts to acquire self-government.

¹Department of State to British Embassy, Feb. 8, 1918, U. S., *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1918, Russia* (Washington, 1931-1932), II, 41-42.

²Statement of the Honorable Breckinridge Long, Third Assistant Secretary of State, before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, August, 1919, file 861.00, XXXIX, Department of State, National Archives, hereafter cited as D.S.N.A.; Charles Seymour, ed., *The Intimate Papers of Colonel House* (Boston, 1926-1928), III, 391.

³Wilson to Robert Lansing (Secretary of State), Feb. 4, 1918, file 861.00/1097, D.S.N.A.

⁴U. S., *Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia*, II, 262-263.

Although Wilson indicated that his desire to cooperate with his Allies was a major consideration in his decision to intervene,⁵ nevertheless, at the very outset of the expedition he indicated his unalterable opposition to the primary reason for which his Allies desired intervention, namely, the establishment of an Eastern Front.

Wilson's real and unpublicized reason for intervention was to preserve the open door in Siberia and North Manchuria and to restrain Japan from imperialistic adventures. When it became evident that, despite his opposition, his Allies were ready to sanction Japan's lone entry into Siberia, and Japan herself was preparing to embark upon an independent expedition under the terms of the Sino-Japanese Military Agreements of May, 1918, the hand of the President was forced. The open door was at stake. If Japan went into Siberia the United States must also go.

The month following Wilson's decision was spent in a useless endeavor to get Japan to agree to the principle of "joint equal military action." Despite the State Department's agreement to permit the Japanese to have the high command in return for a definite limitation on the numbers of Japanese troops to be sent to Siberia,⁶ the final Japanese declaration failed to mention the number of troops participating in the venture. Moreover, the Japanese ambassador made it clear that in the event of an emergency, Japan might be forced to send additional troops "without consultation."⁷

Before the United States had completed its negotiations with Japan, the British, French, Italians and Chinese indicated their intentions to participate in the expedition. Actually, Wilson did not want the participation of Great Britain or France. He had opposed the secret support and encouragement given to factions in various parts of Russia. Lansing expressed the President's

⁵Newton D. Baker (Secretary of War) to Mrs. John B. Casserly, Nov. 5, 1924, Woodrow Wilson Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Ac. 6190.

⁶Frank L. Polk, Confidential Diary, July 16, 1918, Manuscripts Division, Yale University Library; U. S., *Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia*, II, 292.

⁷U. S., *Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia*, II, 324-326; *Japan Year Book, 1919-1920*, pp. 790-791; Polk, Confidential Diary, Aug. 3, 1918.

views when he pointed out: "The participation of these two Governments will give the enterprise the character of interference with the domestic affairs of Russia and create the impression that the underlying purpose is to set up a new pro-Ally Government in Siberia, if not in Russia."⁸

Immediately upon the arrival of troops in Siberia, the divergence of views concerning the purpose of intervention became clearly apparent. While Great Britain and France attempted to extend the scope of military and political action in Siberia, and Japan proceeded with her plans to occupy Manchuria and the Russian Far East, the United States spent its efforts attempting to limit and restrain the independent operations of its Allies.

No sooner had Wilson announced his decision to send an expedition to Siberia than Britain and France sought his cooperation in the establishment of a unified political control of affairs in Siberia. Wilson agreed with Secretary Lansing that these efforts were "simply another move to impress our action in Siberia with the character of intervention rather than relief of the Czechs." When the French suggested that an American High Commissioner be appointed as head of an inter-Allied civilian board, Lansing dismissed the proposal as "bait to draw us into a policy which has been so insistently urged by Great Britain for the past six months."⁹

Wilson agreed. He revealed his anxiety in a letter to Lansing:

The other governments are going much further than we—and much faster—are, indeed, acting upon a plan which is altogether foreign from ours and inconsistent with it.

Please make plain to the French Ambassador that we do not think cooperation in *political* action necessary or desirable in eastern Siberia because we contemplate no political action of any kind there, but only the action of friends who stand at hand and wait to see how they can help. The more plain and emphatic that is made, the less danger will there be of (or?) subsequent misunderstandings and irritations.¹⁰

⁸Lansing to Polk, Aug. 3, 1918, Robert Lansing Papers, Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress.

⁹Lansing to Wilson, Aug. 22, 1918, U. S., *Foreign Relations, The Lansing Papers 1914-1920* (Washington, 1940), II, 378.

¹⁰Wilson to Lansing, Aug. 23, 1918, *Lansing Papers*, II, 378-379.

American troops had scarcely arrived in Siberia when the British government requested that additional troops be sent. The French made a similar request. When the State Department made clear its opposition to such a proposal, the British suggested that the State Department formally request the Japanese government to dispatch the necessary military assistance.¹¹

The President was clearly disturbed by the efforts of his Allies to enlarge the size of the expedition to Siberia. He was concerned because the Czechs were making no attempt to retire. The British ambassador soon found that the President was

... beginning to feel that the Allies are trying to rush, even trick, him into a policy which he had refused to accept. He is well aware that he is committed to the task of rescuing the Czechs, but thinks the Allies are already trying to change the character of the expedition into a full-fledged military intervention with the object of reconstituting the Eastern Front.¹²

Meanwhile, the Czech leaders were pleading for immediate assistance. Without such assistance, they would be forced to retire east of the Ural Mountains. They were opposed to such a retreat because it would leave defenseless those Russians who had supported them against the Bolsheviks.

The President made his position quite clear. If the Czechs desired American cooperation, they must retire to the eastern side of the Urals. The United States would "not be a party to any attempt to form an Eastern front."¹³

All the Allied governments were informed accordingly.¹⁴ Great Britain immediately replied that the decision to hold American troops in Eastern Siberia would not affect her determination to aid the Czechs in holding their position west of the Urals. She felt obligated to assist those Russians who had been loyal allies throughout the war. She intended not only to continue her ef-

¹¹U.S., *Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia*, II, 341-342, *Lansing Papers*, II, 376-377.

¹²Sir William Wiseman to Lord Reading, Aug. 23, 1918, Wiseman Papers, Manuscripts Division, Yale University Library.

¹³Wilson to Lansing, Sept. 17 and 18, 1918, file 861.00/3009, 861.00, 3010, D.S.N.A.

¹⁴U.S., *Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia*, II, 394.

forts in their behalf but also to request the French and Japanese governments to follow British policy in standing by the "loyal" Russians against the Bolsheviks.¹⁵

Actually, Japan had no desire to cooperate in any military activities west of the Ural Mountains. Her designs were concerned primarily with Eastern Siberia and North Manchuria. Thus, she was quite willing to agree with the American position.¹⁶

While Washington resisted Anglo-French efforts to broaden the scope of the Siberian expedition, Tokyo was proceeding along its own independent course. Expressing its concern over the "invasion of Chinese territory by Bolsheviks and organized German war prisoners," the Japanese government indicated its intention to send an independent Japanese force to protect the Manchurian border, this despite China's repeated and emphatic denials that its borders had been violated by Bolsheviks or German prisoners of war.¹⁷

By August 21, the Japanese had stationed twelve thousand troops along the line of the Chinese Eastern Railway.¹⁸ A few days later Tokyo announced its intention to send ten thousand additional troops to the Maritime Province. Its justification for such action was the critical situation of the Czechs, the increased activity of armed German war prisoners, and pressure by the European Allies as well as the Czechs.¹⁹

Japan continued to pour troops into Siberia. By the time the Armistice was signed on November 11, 1918, she had sent three divisions, or some seventy thousand men, all of them under the direct control of the General Staff in Tokyo.²⁰ The Japanese occupation of Eastern Siberia was quite thorough. The whole

¹⁵U.S., *Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia*, II, 403-404.

¹⁶U.S., *Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia*, II, 418.

¹⁷U.S., *Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia*, II, 330-331, 334-335, 348-349.

¹⁸U.S., *Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia*, II, 353.

¹⁹U.S., *Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia*, II, 356-358.

²⁰Lansing to Wilson, Sept. 4, 1918, Wilson Papers, Series II.

operation was aptly described as "a commercial invasion under military convoy."²¹

Once Japanese troops began to pour into Siberia and North Manchuria, the State Department became convinced that Japan would succeed in gaining control of the railways unless the United States took a firm stand. On November 16, 1918, Secretary Lansing made the first of numerous representations to Tokyo concerning Japanese actions.²² The United States protested against the number of Japanese troops in Eastern Asia and the monopoly of control which they exercised there. The State Department recommended that the railways be placed under military control and operated by the Russian Railway Service Corps, a body of American engineers dispatched at the request of the Provisional Government in September, 1917, to operate the Trans-Siberian Railway.

Japan formally rejected the American railway plan, and Japanese military authorities proceeded with their efforts to take over the management and control of the Chinese Eastern Railway.²³ The United States, however, continued to insist that inter-Allied, not exclusive Japanese control, be maintained on the railways.

After a month of patient negotiation and an internal struggle within the Japanese government, an inter-Allied railway agreement was finally reached. Simultaneously, Japan announced the withdrawal of thirty thousand troops from Manchuria.²⁴ Premier Takashi Hara, who had assumed office in September, had been trying to free the Japanese government from the domination of the General Staff. It was obvious that he had won an initial victory over the reactionary military forces.²⁵

²¹Admiral Austin M. Knight to Josephus Daniels (Secretary of Navy) Nov. 4, 1918, WA-6, Russian Situation, Naval Records Collection, National Archives; Ingersoll to F. Leonard, Nov. 17, 1921, file 861.A.00/131, D.S.N.A.; Memorandum on the Japanese Role in the Intervention of Siberia, Oct. 15, 1918, Wiseman Papers; Raymond L. Buell, *The Washington Conference* (New York, 1922), p.27.

²²U.S., *Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia*, II, 433-435.

²³U.S., *Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia*, III, 278-280.

²⁴Polk, Confidential Diary, Dec. 23, 1918.

²⁵U.S., *Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia*, II, 465-466.

The Inter-Allied Railway Agreement of January 9, 1919, provided that the operation of the railroads under Allied military control was to be in the hands of an inter-Allied commission, which in turn was to be advised by John F. Stevens, head of the Russian Railway Service corps, and a Technical Board.²⁶

President Wilson regarded the railway plan as of "inestimable value to the people of Russia and the United States, as well as the world in general . . . thereby giving practical effect to the principle of the open door."²⁷ Advising Congress of American policy in reference to the Trans-Siberian and Chinese Eastern Railways, Wilson wrote:

It is felt that this matter can be treated entirely apart from the general Russian problem, as, irrespective of what our policy may be toward Russia, and irrespective of further (future) Russian developments, it is essential that we maintain the policy of the open door with reference to the Siberian and particularly the Chinese Eastern Railway.²⁸

The Inter-Allied Railway Agreement changed completely the character of intervention in Siberia. The primary concern of American military forces now became the restoration and protection of the railways instead of the rescue of the Czechs. The latter were now participating in the execution of the railway plan. In effect, the improvement of the transportation system served to aid the anti-Bolshevik cause. Thus, despite its denials, the United States became an active participant in the Russian Civil War. President Wilson justified this course on the grounds of maintaining the open door in Siberia and North Manchuria and preserving Russia's territorial integrity.²⁹ In this respect the conclusion of the Railway Agreement represented a victory for the United States and the liberal civilian elements in the Japanese government.

The Japanese military were not slow in revealing their real attitude toward cooperation with the United States in Siberia.

²⁶U.S., *Foreign Relations, 1919, Russia*, p. 239.

²⁷U.S., *Foreign Relations, 1919, Russia*, pp. 246-248.

²⁸U.S., *Foreign Relations, 1919, Russia*, pp. 244, 250-251.

²⁹U.S., *Foreign Relations, 1919, Russia*, p. 494; Memorandum of John F. Stevens, Railway Service Corps Papers, Hoover War Library, Stanford University.

Despite the Railway Agreement and continuous efforts to avoid factional strife, American forces were constantly embroiled in difficulty with Japan or with the Siberian factions which she supported. At times incidents with both almost led to actual hostilities.

The Kolchak or Omsk government, established in November, 1918, was supreme in Western Siberia. Supported by the Czechs, it maintained an army which was engaged in conducting a campaign against the Bolsheviks. Kolchak was supported strongly by the British and French representatives in Siberia, who were eager to have the Allied governments recognize his rule. Kolchak, however, was unable to control two independent Cossack leaders, Gregorii Semenov and Ivan Kalmykov, who used the chaotic conditions in Siberia as a means of increasing their own wealth and power. Semenov destroyed railway transportation, interrupted telegraphic communications, and terrorized the eastern regions with his irresponsible actions. There was ample evidence to indicate that his activities were directly encouraged and supported by Japan.³⁰ Japanese military authorities refused to protect the representatives of the Technical Board in the performance of their railway duties, despite Semenov's hostile acts against them. They maintained that such actions would be interference in Russian internal affairs.³¹

To Roland S. Morris, American ambassador to Japan, the Japanese plan was perfectly clear:

Baffled by the railway agreement in their organized attempt to take possession of the Chinese Eastern and Trans-Siberian Railway as far as Chita and thus dominate eastern Siberia and northern Manchuria the Japanese Government is countenancing a less obvious, but a more insidious scheme of operating through the Cossack organization which is the only substantial support Kolchak has east of Chita. It will not be difficult for Japan to dispose of the eastern Cossacks when they have served the purpose.³²

³⁰Paul S. Reinsch (Ambassador to China) to Polk, Dec. 9, 1918, Polk to Lansing, Jan. 2, 1919, Roland S. Morris (Ambassador to Japan) to Lansing, Jan. 10, 1919, files 861.00/3368, 861.00/3617b, 861.00/3622, D.S.N.A.

³¹U.S., *Foreign Relations, 1919, Russia*, pp. 570, 572-573.

³²Morris to Polk, July 17, 1919, U.S., *Foreign Relations, 1919, Russia*, p. 567.

While the Omsk authorities were disturbed about the actions of the Japanese and Cossacks, they were equally provoked with the "un-neutral" policy of American troops. General William S. Graves, commander of American expeditionary forces, held rigidly to a strict interpretation of his instructions and refused to take action for or against either Kolchak or the Bolsheviks, except insofar as each side might benefit from the protection of the railway sectors and military stores assigned to his command. The Omsk government stated flatly that American troops were accomplishing no useful purpose in Siberia but were doing actual harm in tending to prolong disturbed conditions. The British and French governments sustained the objections of the Omsk government.³³

President Wilson was obviously troubled about the entire Siberian situation. He presented his problem to the Council of Four in Paris. He pointed out that although the United States did not believe in Kolchak, the British and French military representatives in Siberia were supporting him. Kolchak, who regarded American soldiers as neutrals, was quite irritated by their presence on the railway. The Cossacks were also antagonistic toward American soldiers. Wilson suspected that the Japanese would be glad to see a collision between the two groups. In these circumstances, Wilson believed that the United States must either take sides with Kolchak and send a much stronger force to Siberia or withdraw. If the United States aided Kolchak and increased its forces in Siberia, Japan would increase hers still more. If American troops continued merely to guard the railroad and to maintain a neutral position, Wilson was advised that collisions would occur, which might result in actual war. If American troops were withdrawn, Siberia would be left to the Japanese and Kolchak. The President's dilemma was quite evident. Although he favored a neutral policy toward Russia and Siberia, at the same time he did not wish to withdraw American soldiers from Siberia and leave Japan in control of the situation. This would mean an end to the cherished open door policy.

³³Omsk government to Boris Bakhmetev, April 24, 1919, U.S., *Foreign Relations, 1919, Russia*, pp. 494-496.

Personally, Wilson had always believed that the proper policy for the Allied and Associated powers was "to clear out of Russia and leave it to the Russians to fight it out among themselves."³⁴ Yet for two reasons American troops continued to remain in Siberia. For all practical purposes American evacuation would have left Japan in virtual control of North Manchuria and Eastern Siberia. Moreover, Britain, France, and Japan were opposed to withdrawal. President Wilson did not wish to jeopardize his program at the Peace Conference by independent action. Thus, in order to block Japan and to further his League, Wilson followed a policy which appeared to be totally at variance not only with the principles which he had enunciated concerning Russia, but also with the principles of his proposed League. As time went on, these clashes between what Wilson said and what he did made the American position in Siberia even more difficult. Wilson soon found it impossible to keep American troops in Siberia without actively aiding Kolchak. Whatever may be said concerning America's neutrality in Siberia in 1918, there is little doubt that in 1919 the State Department actively supported and aided Kolchak despite the fact that Wilson himself admitted that the American people did not believe in Kolchak. However, the Bolsheviks themselves conceded America's justification in following such a policy, when in 1933, after being shown certain documents concerning America's policy, they agreed to drop all claims against America for her part in the Siberian intervention.³⁵ As Cordell Hull pointed out, "These latter documents made clear to Litvinov that American forces had not been in Siberia to wrest territory from Russia, but to ensure the withdrawal of the Japanese, who had a far larger force in Siberia with the intent to occupy it permanently."³⁶

It would seem to be notable, however, that throughout the intervention the American public was permitted to believe that

³⁴Notes of a meeting held at President Wilson's house in the Place des Etats-Unis, Paris, May 9, 1919, U.S., *Foreign Relations, 1919, Russia*, pp. 345-347.

³⁵N. W. Graham, "Russian-American Relations, 1917-1933: An Interpretation"; *American Political Science Review*, XXVIII (June, 1934), 408-409.

³⁶Cordell Hull, *Memoirs*, (New York, 1948), I, 299.

the United States went into Siberia to combat Bolshevism. It was difficult for the State Department to refute this belief while the United States was at war. Japan was an ally, and it was not considered diplomatic to question publicly the motives of one's allies, especially when a fear existed that Japan might possibly join the Central Powers. Even after the war was over, the popular feeling persisted that intervention was solely to defeat the Bolsheviks. This sentiment was intensified by the actions of the underlings in the State Department who assumed control of America's policy in Siberia upon Wilson's illness, and who themselves favored Kolchak and wanted him to receive the greatest aid possible.

Since the attitude of the State Department had long since ceased to be neutral, why did the United States withdraw its troops in 1920? Why were they not maintained and reinforced? The answer appears in a simple note written by Secretary Lansing to the President:

The truth of the matter is the simple fact that the Kolchak Government has utterly collapsed; the armies of the Bolsheviks have advanced into Eastern Siberia, where they are reported to be acting with moderation. The people seem to prefer them to the officers of the Kolchak regime. Further, the Bolshevik army is approaching the region where our soldiers are, and contact with them will lead to open hostilities and to many complications. In other words, if we do not withdraw we shall have to wage war against the Bolsheviks.³⁷

American troops remained in Vladivostok until a substantial portion of the Czech troops were afloat. The last contingent of Americans left Vladivostok on April 1, 1920. Few tears were shed over their departure. America's part in the Siberian situation had already been summarized aptly, if somewhat facetiously, by the remark that "some might have liked us more if we had intervened less, . . . some might have disliked us less if we had intervened more," but that having intervened "no more nor no less than we actually did, nobody had any use for us at all."³⁸

³⁷Lansing to Wilson, Dec. 23, 1919, *Lansing Papers*, II, 392.

³⁸*Literary Digest*, LXII (Sept. 6, 1919) 60.

Clues to the Soviet Political Archives

BY JOHN A. ARMSTRONG

A MAJOR obstacle to investigation of the Soviet political system is the lack of documentary sources. Published Soviet documents are usually so clearly designed to serve propaganda purposes as to be of very limited value for objective studies. A considerable number of more useful documents are indeed available for the first decade of Soviet rule, for the most part in the collections of émigrés. During the German invasion, a number of documents from Soviet state and Communist Party archives dealing with a somewhat later period were obtained.¹ For the more recent period of Soviet politics, however, revealing documentary material is almost wholly lacking. It is evident that the detailed reports on Party and state affairs appearing in the Soviet press are based on extensive archival collections. While the existence of such collections is occasionally alluded to by Soviet writers, however, specific references in Soviet publications are very rare.

Unpublished Soviet dissertations present a sharply contrasting picture. Not only do they list the collections of documentary material utilized, but cite individual documents to support specific assertions; frequently complete references to the location of these documents are provided. Recently the writer of this study was able to examine copies of twenty unpublished dissertations in the Lenin State Library, Moscow.² Most of them

¹The most important group consists of the "Smolensk archive," now being analyzed by American scholars. See the *New York Times*, January 23, 1955.

²All but one of the dissertations were submitted for the degree of candidate of historical sciences; historians conduct most studies of recent political topics. The candidate degree is the highest degree normally obtained before a Soviet scholar starts his career. The dissertations for the rare doctoral degree, usually obtained only by "established scholars,"

dealt with the organization and activities of the Communist Party of the Ukraine during the past twenty years, though a few treated more general problems of administration and foreign policy. While severe time limitations made it impossible to examine a broader sample of dissertations, it is felt that the twenty studied are probably reasonably representative in their use of source material for investigation of recent political activities.

All the dissertations examined utilized documentary material, which in most cases comprised about half of the sources cited. Dissertations dealing with topics with fairly narrow chronological and geographic limits tended, of course, to be more exhaustive in their use of source material. In addition, most dissertations utilized published Party resolutions and records of conferences; laws and legal commentaries; books and periodicals, especially Party journals; and central and local newspapers. Since many of these sources—particularly the local newspapers—are wholly unavailable outside the U.S.S.R., even their treatment in the dissertations is frequently of considerable interest.

The documentary citations, however, form much the most interesting aspect of the Soviet dissertations. The citations refer to a surprisingly wide variety of archives. By far the most important are Party archives, although state collections are frequently cited. There appears to be no sharp distinction between the types of material contained in these groups. For example, a document in the Stanislav provincial state archives is cited for material on the number of Communists dispatched to work in the province by the principal Party body in the Ukraine, the Central Committee. For the most part, however, only lower-level state archives—those of the provinces, the provincial executive committees, and the cities—are utilized. One dissertation does, however, use the Central State Archives of the October Revolution.

The Party archives cited by the dissertation writers are more numerous and represent more varied levels of the Soviet system.

frequently appear in published form. Soviet academic regulations require that dissertations be approved by the Central Certification Commission, and that a copy be deposited in the Lenin Library, which maintains an elaborate subject index. As my Soviet visa was limited to thirty days, I was able to spend only about one week in examining the dissertations.

A few dissertations utilized archives in the Moscow headquarters of the Party; but, as is natural in the case of studies primarily concerned with the Ukraine, the central collections are of secondary importance. References to this group of archives include those of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union; of the Higher Party School of the Central Committee; and of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism, the major center for Party theoretical studies.³

A far more important archival source for the dissertations examined is the Party Archive of the Ukrainian Branch of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism. About half of the dissertations used its collection, which, in addition to important Party materials, includes data on state affairs, such as the background of deputies to the Supreme Soviet of the Ukraine. Qualitatively more important, however, are the citations from the archives of the most important branches of the Ukrainian Party apparatus, the Propaganda and Agitation Section and the Party Organs Section. The archive of the latter section, which supervises Party personnel, contains a mass of detailed information on the officials of the apparatus. While much of the information in the dissertations does not differ markedly from that occasionally published in the Ukrainian press, many details concerning the Party training and nationality composition of officials have never appeared in print.

Decidedly the most important document collections used in the dissertations examined are those in the archives of the obkoms, or provincial Party committees. This is to be expected, as many dissertations dealt with one or a few provinces. But the obkom archives cited include much significant material from higher Party levels. For example, a decision of the Ukrainian Organization Bureau (before 1952 a Party committee second in importance only to the Political Bureau) is cited from the Kiev obkom archive. Apparently the document was found there because it related to the work of the Party organization of the Ukrainian Ministry of Agriculture, a unit of the Kiev oblast

³Prior to 1953 this institute was called the Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute, and from 1953 until April, 1956, the Marx-Engels-Lenin-Stalin Institute (abbreviated IMELS).

Party structure. One would assume that there is a complete file of decisions of the Orgburo in the archives of the Central Committee, also located in Kiev. It would seem, however, that Soviet researchers utilize such materials in the first archive in which they find them, without endeavoring to check copies in higher-level collections.

As is the case with other Soviet archives, the obkom collections contain a great deal of information on state affairs. Most material in the dissertations concerning oblast state officials came from these collections.

Of special interest are the collections of documents relating to political activity during World War II. Immediately after the Red Army had reoccupied the entire Ukraine, the Soviet press announced that a Commission for the History of the Great Patriotic War in the Ukraine had been formed.⁴ Little, if any, information on the activity of this body has since appeared in print. Several dissertations, however, use material from its archive. The collection seems to be quite comprehensive; it includes such items as sets of Ukrainian nationalist newspapers published under German occupation and records of the trials of Greek Catholic bishops in Galicia. The obkom archives also contain important material concerning Party activities during the war, particularly in underground and partisan organization. In addition, the dissertation writers have been able to draw on the files of various "partisan staffs," organizations attached to military commands during the war, but under close Party and NKVD control. Apparently, however, the Red Army archives themselves have not been opened to writers of dissertations.

Some of the copious material collected concerning wartime activities has been used in constructing elaborate propaganda displays on local war history found in many city museums. Until very recently, however, Soviet scholars have been able to do little to exploit this material systematically. That this is a sore point with them is suggested by a conversation this writer had with a student in Moscow University, who said, "You [Americans] are doing more to write our history of that period than we are ourselves." During the past two years, the Soviet press

⁴*Radianska Ukraina*, September 20, 1944.

has conducted an intermittent campaign to stimulate studies of the war period. In view of the availability of archival material, one may anticipate very interesting productions in this little-known area if the political "line" is propitious.

There is considerable evidence that much of the more significant political material is deposited in the MVD archives. Only two dissertations examined used these collections, and then only for rather trivial materials such as variant texts of early treatises. Apparently what research is done in the police archives is carried out by the MVD officials themselves; for example, the most exhaustive Soviet study of any political aspect of World War II, *The Partisan War of the Whole People in Belorussia against the Fascist Aggressors*, was written by Lavrentii F. Tsanava, then Minister of State Security of Belorussia.⁵

Even the Party archives which provide the principal source for the dissertations examined appear to have become generally available to Soviet students fairly recently. Only six of the dissertations examined were completed before 1953, i.e., before Stalin's death. Of these six, two rely almost entirely on published sources, although there is obviously considerable documentary material bearing on their topics. One, completed in 1947, has a dedication (an unusual feature for a Soviet dissertation) to the "Thirtieth Anniversary of the Cheka-OGPU-NKVD-MGB" which have "always battled for the Great October Socialist Revolution." This apparently assured its success, for the study is extremely poor in form as well as in content. Significantly, both of the dissertations which used the MVD archives date from the pre-1955 period, though, as noted before, neither contains very revealing material. On the other hand, two of the best dissertations were completed in 1953; it seems possible therefore that some access to Party archives was permitted before Stalin's death, but that the more thorough studies could be presented only after controls were relaxed following his death.

Several of the dissertations examined show that their authors

⁵Tsanava has since been purged as a cohort of Beria (*New York Times*, May 30, 1956). I was told in Minsk that his work on the partisan movements is out of print.

had a keen sense of discrimination in the use of sources. The dissertation of M. B. Pogrebinskii, published fairly early, is outstanding in this respect. The thirty-page analysis of sources available for his topic (Kiev province during the war) carefully describes the types of material available and those which he was unable to secure. Among the latter were many Party documents, which, Pogrebinskii states, were destroyed during the Soviet evacuation in 1941. Also missing are many of the *raion* (district) newspapers for the early months of the war, while the surviving numbers can be found only in the Lenin Library.

The available evidence indicates that the best of the Soviet students make earnest efforts to utilize fully documentary source material. This conclusion was borne out by the present writer's conversations with more advanced Soviet scholars, especially in the Academy of Sciences of the Ukraine. They evidenced a strong interest in American holdings of documentary material relating to events in the U.S.S.R. during the war—e.g., the German documents collected for the Nuremberg war criminal trials, now deposited in the National Archives of the United States. Several Soviet scholars asked if they would be permitted to use such archives if they visited the United States.

From the technical standpoint, Soviet scholars in the area of recent political developments appear to be prepared to utilize significant materials. The losses of documents incurred during the war, the apparent lack of systematic division of materials among archives, and the withholding of significant material in the MVD archives all impose severe handicaps on Soviet scholarship in this area, however. There is little doubt, too, that the completed studies are themselves censored to prevent the presentation of distinctly damaging information, or the revelation of official secrets.

In spite of these limitations, the dissertations present a great amount of material from archives to which Western scholars are scarcely able to obtain direct access. Moreover, the standard of analysis is in general sufficiently high to make these studies one of the more valuable sources on recent Soviet politics.

The Imperial Russian General Staff and India: A Footnote to Diplomatic History

BY WARREN B. WALSH

ONE of the constants of nineteenth century diplomacy was, "as every schoolboy knows," Anglo-Russian rivalry sharpening at times into hostility and undermined always by mutual distrust. The same all-knowing schoolboy is also aware that British fears of Russian aggression toward India were also a constant factor in the relations between the two major powers. The Afghan Wars were, of course, outgrowths or manifestations of this general situation. So were the fairly numerous "scare" articles which appeared recurrently in British periodicals and the more elaborate but equally sensational books such as *The Russians at the Gates of Herat*.¹ Scarcely less sensational were some of the diplomatic and consular despatches of the period. Sometimes the charges were sweeping—that the Imperial Russian government planned an invasion of India or at least of the borderlands of India. Variations upon this were claims either that such plans were being made by the Russian military behind the backs of the Russian diplomats or that certain individuals (e.g., Generals Kaufman and Skobelev) had more aggressive ambitions along these lines than did the government at St. Petersburg. Whatever the explanation offered, the main thesis was rarely challenged. There seems no doubt that belief in the Russian threat to India was one of the motivations of British policy toward Russia in the nineteenth century.

The question here addressed is not, therefore, the sincerity or reality of the British opinion nor of its effects. But, rather, were

¹Written by Charles T. Marvin whom his publisher described as the "principal authority of the English Press on the Central Asia Dispute." The American edition was published by Scribners in 1885.

the British apprehensions well founded? Here is the familiar problem of "What was objective reality?" *versus* "What did men of the time consider objective reality to be?" It seemed to President Monroe, to cite a well-known example, that the danger of European intervention in the New World was an objective reality, and he acted upon that belief. Hindsight suggests that the President was mistaken in his estimate. Was the British fear of Russian intentions toward India in the nineteenth century, especially in the latter part of that century, a parallel case?

One line of inquiry is to examine the voluminous *Sbornik geograficheskikh, topograficheskikh, i statisticheskikh materialov po Asii* published by and for the Russian General Staff.² As its title suggests, this is a potpourri of many ingredients. Some of the articles are staff studies; some, personal papers; others are the results of personal or staff reconnaissance; and still others are translations of materials which originally appeared in non-Russian publications. The articles vary in importance as they do in caliber. More importantly, an examination of the *Sbornik* leads to inferences rather than to definitive proofs. One may, for example, infer from a sudden spate of documents on India and the land approaches to India that the Russian military leaders thought the problem of special interest or significance at that time. But since the function of a General Staff is to prepare for actions which it may be called upon one day to undertake, it would not be safe to conclude that a burst of interest proved an intention to undertake military action. It should also be added that the examination of the *Sbornik* here reported upon was careful but not exhaustive. To make a truly exhaustive examination of the literally thousands of pages of the eighty-odd volumes would require far more manhours than this preliminary study indicated it would be worth in added findings.

Many of the articles were in the nature of generalized brief-

²Collection of Geographical, Topographical and Statistical Materials on Asia. 83 volumes, St. Petersburg, 1883-1910. These were, to use a modern term, classified documents and were designated as "Secret." They will be cited simply as *Sbornik* with appropriate volume number. The basic research upon which this article is based was done by Mr. Daniel Gallik while a student in Syracuse University Russian Programs. The translations are Mr. Gallik's.

ings about various states, areas, regions, districts, or cities.³ Others dealt with the fortifications of such Afghan towns as Herat, Kabul, and Kandahar. A number of articles were concerned with estimates of the military and economic strength of India and there were some descriptions of Indian strongholds.⁴ This meant nothing more than the sort of interest one would expect a General Staff to display. Similar reports and articles were published on China, Manchuria, Persia, and Japan. The possibility, even the probability, of an armed clash with the British in Central Asia was frequently brought to the Staff's attention. Colonel Matveev, an officer of the General Staff, wrote the following warning in 1877:

Pretended fears for India constantly have been and will be the fundamental reason for England's hostile policy toward us in Europe and this policy will assuredly lead, sooner or later, to armed clashes between the English and ourselves in Asia, clashes capable of having fateful consequences for British might in India.⁵

This same Colonel felt that the terrain would force Russia, in the event of the armed clash he anticipated, to depend largely upon a line of communications running across Afghanistan roughly from the northwest to the southeast.

By the characteristics of the region [he wrote] the northwestern boundary of India is more accessible . . . and in the event of a break with England, the main theatre of war will in all probability be the Kabul plain, whereas Persia and western Afghanistan would serve as bases, and the main strategical points would be Herat, Kandahar, and Kabul. In this case, our main line of operations would stretch from the Caucasus through Persia to Herat and further through Kabul or Kandahar to the Penjab valley.⁶

If you trace on a map the line of communications recommended by Colonel Matveev, you will see at once why subsequent staff studies concerned themselves with problems of

³For example: P. M. Vlasov, "Kratkii Oчерk Khorosana," *Sbornik*, vol. 56, pp. 176 ff.

⁴Vol. 51 of the *Sbornik* contains several typical reports on Herat. On India, see, for example, MacGregor, "Oborona Indii," two parts, *Sbornik* Vols. 43 and 44.

⁵"Poezdka generalnogo shtaba Polkovnika Matveeva po Bukharskim i Afganskim vladeniiam v Fevrale 1877 g., *Sbornik*, vol. 5, p. 52.

⁶*Loc. cit.*, p. 53.

travel, transport, and supply. Distances are great and the difficulties of terrain are formidable. Various reconnaissances were made, including one through the Pamirs in 1891 which greatly aroused British apprehensions. The 1891 expedition, commanded by Colonel Ionov (Yanoff), reconnoitered possible routes through the Pamirs to India. This led one member of the expedition, Staff-Captain Skersky, to recommend the annexation of the Pamirs.

The annexation of the Pamirs by Russia . . . [reported Skerski] is also desirable for purely military considerations. Although the Pamirs, because of their harsh climate and difficult terrain, will probably never serve as a theatre for large-scale operations (war), detachments will undoubtedly be sent through these highlands in the event of a conflict with Afghanistan and India.

In the first case [a war with Afghanistan] whether our main army operated from Bukhara . . . or from Merv, a detachment in the Pamirs would threaten northern Badakhshan and northern Afghanistan to such an extent that it would inevitably divert a significant portion of the enemy's forces away from the main theatre of operations.

In the second case [a war with India], the length of the operational line of advance on India would be shortened by 500 versts if we hold the highlands. An operational line through the Pamirs is not exposed to any particular danger even under present political conditions. A serious thrust from the Chinese is not to be expected. The attention of the Afghans, undoubtedly allies of England, would be fastened upon . . . our main army . . . and they would only become aware too late that we had cut off their relations with their subjects in the eastern part of the highlands.⁷

The General Staff continued its interest in these matters for several years. The volumes for 1893 and 1894 contain a number of reports on routes and traveling conditions for troops through Afghanistan, western Persia, and Russian Central Asia. An earlier study by General Kuropatkin had concerned itself with various types of suitable vehicles for military transport through these lands.⁸ Such studies may be regarded, as suggested above, as being routine rather than indicative of specifically planned

⁷"Kratkii orcherk Pamira," *Sbornik*, vol. 50, p. 15.

⁸See, for example, Kuznetsov, "Pamiry," *Sbornik*, vol. 56, pp. 1-39; and Blumer, "Doroga ot Tavriza v gorod Zendzhan," *Sbornik* vol. 54, pp. 1-30. Kuropatkin's study was entitled, "Zapiska ob obozakh dlia voisk Turkestanskogo voennogo okruga," *Sbornik*, vol. 5, pp. 120-152.

operations. This may be what led some observers to explain the Russian activities as being of local inspiration; due, that is, to the special interests and ambitions of officers stationed in Central Asia. Many of the articles and reports were written by such officers, which is what one would expect. They were published, however, by the General Staff in St. Petersburg which would indicate that the top command was cognizant and presumably approved of the actions taken and the opinions expressed.

On the other side of the picture, the views expressed in the documents examined in this preliminary study do not suggest any gulf between the soldiers and the diplomats. The Foreign Office view was well summarized by instructions sent to the Russian Consul in Bombay in 1900:

The fundamental meaning of India to us is that she represents Great Britain's most vulnerable point, a sensitive nerve on which one touch may perhaps easily induce Her Majesty's Government to alter its hostile policy toward us, and to show the desired compliance on all those questions where our . . . interests may collide.⁹

This seems a shrewd if somewhat overly optimistic analysis and a reasonable explanation of Russia's real intentions. Britain, standing alone in India, was certainly more susceptible to pressure than Britain, standing more or less in company with the other western powers in the Near East. The Germans were not alone in playing the game of *Weltpolitik*. The Russians did it, too. In fact, some five years prior to the quoted instruction, France and Russia together had succeeded very well in applying pressure to Britain in the Far East. But we need not depend on analogy and inference. Prior to the final approval of the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, Zinoviev, sometime Russian Ambassador to the Ottoman Empire, wrote:

It has now become extremely desirable that our Black Sea fleet be cured of its impotency, and that access to the Mediterranean be secured for it. It appears possible to raise this question only on condition that we are able to establish sincere cooperation with England. All plans for attack upon India are untenable and must be relegated to the field of fantasy. Concessions could be made on

⁹A. Popov, "Angliiskaia politika v Indii i Russkoe-Induskie otnosheniya v 1897-1905 gg." *Krasnyi Arkhiv*, vol. 19 (Moscow, Gosizdat, 1925) pp. 53-63.

our side regarding the Central Asian question in case England is prepared to assist in solving the problem of the Straits.¹⁰

The Ambassador's advice seems to imply two things; first, that there had been plans for an attack upon India, and, secondly, that Russia had been using such plans (or the threat of them) as an instrument of national policy to bring pressure on the British. He was apparently suggesting that the instrument would have to be abandoned, but that a price might be exacted for its abandonment.

This leaves unanswered our question of what was the objective reality of the Russia-Britain-India relation. At least, it leaves us without any definitive answer. The inquiry, however, has had a negative finding. Nothing was turned up in the *Sbornik* which suggested that plans for an attack on India ever got really close to a crisis or action stage. The prospects that an armed clash between Russian and British forces might take place in Central Asia were constantly and, quite normally, under review by the military. Preliminary planning was done and preliminary studies in support of plans were made. This degree of activity, at the very least, made the threat of attack a usable instrument for Russian diplomacy. It is the tentative conclusion that this, politically speaking, was its main purpose.

¹⁰Zinoviev, "Sekretnaya zapiska o soglashenii mezhdu Rossiei i Angliei," Central Asian Department, Case No. 86, Document 145. Quoted in I. Reisner, "Anglo-Russkaia Konventsia 1907 g. i razdel Afganistana," *Krasnyi Arkhiv*, vol. 10, pp. 54-66.

Book Reviews

BARGHOORN, FREDERICK C. *Soviet Russian Nationalism*. New York, Oxford University Press, 1956. 330 pp. \$7.00.

The emergence and growth of Great Russian nationalism during the past forty years may well be considered one of the most persistent as well as puzzling aspects of Soviet history. It intrigues, because it stands in direct contradiction to all the fundamental tenets of Communism and — given its universalist aspirations — to its interests as well. In this book Professor Barghoorn has given the problem the attention it deserves. His work is a thorough historical and sociological analysis of the development and prospects of Soviet Russian nationalism.

Mr. Barghoorn's analysis rests on one basic premise: that the Soviet Union is in fact a nation-state, and not, as it claims to be and as it appears to some scholars, a multi-national state, or, to put it more bluntly, an empire. This nation-state is fashioned of an amalgam of Soviet cultural values, the product of Marxist ideology and an industrialized society, and Great Russian national culture. The future of the national minorities appears to him dim: sooner or later they are destined to assimilate or disappear, losing their identity in the new Soviet civilization. This thesis, greatly simplified in this summary, the author upholds with a wealth of data selected from a variety of written and oral sources, and from his personal

experience as diplomat and traveller in the Soviet Union.

In the small space allotted a review it is not possible to deal adequately with all the complex problems upon which this important book touches. All that one can do is to state one's attitude to the central thesis which the book advances.

It seems to me that in approaching the problem Mr. Barghoorn was unduly influenced by the American experience, by the image of the emergence of a new, synthetic culture through the blending of Anglo-Saxon elements with the culture of a pioneer or immigrant people who developed a new way of life on a virtually uninhabited continent. His concept of "Soviet" culture strikes one as the counterpart of the concept of American culture (or way of life), and the role he assigns to Great Russian civilization resembles that which Anglo-Saxon civilization had played in this country. What he has to say of the fate of the national minorities in the Soviet Union bears striking similarity to the history of national minorities in the United States. The American background of his approach is discernible not only in the general framework, but also in his criteria of national consciousness, as, for example, in his emphasis on the significance of national animosities among ethnic groups.

Yet the American example is unique, and not applicable to the Soviet Union. The minority groups in the United States consist predominantly of persons 1) who gen-

erally belonged to the lowest strata of the population, i.e., to strata which were deprived of the benefits of their own national cultures, and readily accepted Anglo-Saxon culture, to which they had nothing to oppose; and 2) who voluntarily cut their ties with the native land, and migrated for the express purpose of becoming Americans. Neither is the case with the non-Russian groups in the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union is the result of conquests of socially stratified peoples possessing their own territories, languages, and historic traditions. National consciousness here is not a result of prejudice or discrimination practiced by dominant ethnic groups toward less privileged ones, as in the United States, and hence bound to decrease with the spread of a common cultural type and the improvement of the standard of living, but a manifestation of a people's desire to defend its way of life and its interests. Whereas democratization and industrialization in the United States denote the gradual disappearance of ethnic differences, in empires such as the Soviet Union they denote the very opposite: the growth of national consciousness and the crystallization of national cultures.

The models for the developments in this sphere are to be found in the colonial areas of the Western powers, especially the French Union, whose problems in many respects resemble those faced by the Russians. The French, too, had hoped to assimilate the natives of their colonial possessions, and to establish, by means of colonization, education, political representation, and so forth, a French commonwealth whose diverse races would live together as one nation. The effort,

though conducted by much more enlightened methods than those used in the Soviet Union, failed. It is precisely the most Westernized native who today leads the fight for national independence in the overseas possessions of France.

That Russification is progressing in the Soviet Union cannot be denied, though the extent of this program is subject to debate. But the spread of Russian civilization does not necessarily entail the disappearance of national cultures among the minorities. Russian language and culture are to many of the minority groups, especially to those living in the Eastern area, what English was to the Indians, or French to the Levantines: a means of contact with Western civilization. Through it, the minority intelligentsia acquires all the tools, ideological and technical, with which to bolster their national pride and assert their ambition. Roughly speaking, Russian is to Georgian or Uzbek what in the eighteenth century French had been to Russian; of itself it will no more de-nationalize the minorities than French had de-nationalized the Russians, though there were people who feared that this could be the case.

The whole subject is most involved, and there is certainly more than one set of answers to the important question: is Russia losing or gaining in national diversification? Mr. Barghoorn deserves the gratitude of every student of Russia for having provided a solid basis on which the discussion can henceforth proceed.

RICHARD PIPES

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SCHAPIRO, LEONARD. *The Origin of the Communist Autocracy. Political Opposition in the Soviet State*. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1956. 397 pp. \$7.00.

In the period between 1917 and 1922 the Communist's struggles with other revolutionary parties of Russia as well as the struggles between factions in their own party shaped the Soviet state into what it is today. The story of how and why Lenin defeated his rivals for power is told by Leonard Schapiro with a wealth of detailed and often new information. His book is a first-rate contribution not only to Russian history but also to the study of total power. Among its great achievements the following deserve special mention:

1. It covers in one volume and with one focus of attention the series of conflicts which were even more important than the Revolution itself in setting up the Communist totalitarian state—conflicts over such issues as the compulsory grain collections, the peace with Germany, trade union control of industrial production, freedom of the press for socialist newspapers, and freedom of criticism within the party. The reader clearly perceives the pattern of preferences which has been characteristic of Leninist Communists. The present study does not include a treatment of the later fights over The New Economic Policy, the policy toward the peasantry, socialism in one country, the "withering away" of the state, dialectic materialism, etc. In all of these conflicts of a later period, the pattern remains the same as that which Mr. Schapiro describes in the earlier struggles. Still, it is to be hoped that Mr. Schapiro will devote a second vol-

ume to the second phase and thus complete his history of total power in the Soviet state.

2. It proves with detailed information that it was Lenin himself who established what we are in the habit of calling the Stalinist system. Lenin, reacting to those whom he had stamped enemies of the Revolution, pronounced indefinite the duration of the "period of transition" in which the Party would govern dictatorially, favored ruthless terror, even in the judicial system, set up the one-man management system in industry, declared the peasants enemies of the Revolution, eliminated all other political parties (even while admitting that classes other than the proletariat would continue to exist for a long time) and banned all criticism of the Central Committee within and without the Party. It was Lenin who set the pattern of using an issue of principle to drive opponents from positions of influence and after victory adopting the policies the vanquished foe had proposed. It was Lenin who in every such fight identified his ascendancy with the Revolution. As Mr. Schapiro's story unfolds it becomes clear that Stalin was hardly more than the highly skillful administrator of the legacy which Lenin left in 1922. We should recognize that "Stalinism" is a misnomer if used to convey the idea that Stalin's system was confined to the period of his personal rule. Soviet Communism has been "Stalinist" from the very beginning and is likely to remain so as long as it adheres to Lenin's authority.

3. It throws considerable light on the parties and factions which were defeated by the Central Committee in these struggles for power—the Mensheviks, the Social Revolu-

tionaries, the Workers' opposition trade unions, the military administrators, the Soviets, etc. This is a matter of great interest for the Western reader who wants to know how it was possible for powerful forces such as the SR's and the Mensheviks to go down to defeat at the hands of what amounted sometimes to a mere handful of Leninists. These struggles were not decided by superior firepower. We are, therefore, indebted to Mr. Schapiro's detailed analysis of what neutralized the political fighting strength of Lenin's opponents or paralyzed their will to victory.

While Mr. Schapiro deserves high praise for these contributions, his interpretation of the phenomenon of Communism as a whole is one with which this reviewer is inclined to disagree. It is not set forth separately but rather emerges from a series of theses scattered throughout the book. Thus, for example, he states that Bolshevism is "less a doctrine than a technique of action for the seizing and holding of power"; that the forms of Communist rule "developed in response more to the needs of preserving an unpopular minority in power than to any tenets of Marxist theory"; that the various parties and factions struggled with each other over differences of method rather than of theory; that the element of personal conflict was more important than the conflict of principles; that Lenin's personal skill was the main cause of his victories; that Lenin, had he been a "great man," would have availed himself of the opportunity he had in 1921 to rebuild Russia on the basis of "cooperation and legal order," rather than to choose the path of Central Committee dictatorship.

As Mr. Schapiro's theses are thus laid side by side, they may appear to some readers to have little to do with each other. To this reviewer, however, they spell out a consistent, if erroneous *aperçu* of Communism. In Mr. Schapiro's eyes, Lenin chose the path of dictatorship in 1921 not because he was a Communist but because he was not a great man; Lenin's enemies were defeated ultimately not by their own ideological weaknesses but by Lenin's superior skill. The struggles turned mainly on personal enmities and questions of method, so, again, doctrine is supposed to have played no role in them. If Mr. Schapiro's views were correct, would we not have to conclude that there is no such thing as Communism, because then all that is left would be: a) successful method, — to which certainly others than the Communists would have had equal access, and b) the accident of personal ability — on which the Communists cannot claim a monopoly either? Would we not have to conclude that Communism lacks the identity of continuity, since the decisive personal element of Lenin differs from that of Stalin, Malenkov, or Khrushchev? If Communism were but a method for seizing and holding power, how could one explain the Communist policy of making enemies of the peasants and causing a catastrophic deterioration of Soviet agriculture? Certainly, one could think of more promising ways of cultivating power in a mainly agrarian country. If questions of method were all that separates Communists from other socialists, why this unrelenting persecution of deviationists with periodic earthquake effects in the entire Soviet power structure? Surely, the demonic dynamism of

the Communists must have escaped Mr. Schapiro who can see in it nothing but a response to the need of preserving an unpopular minority in power. Surely, he must have the utmost difficulty in identifying this minority, explaining how its members know each other, and grasping the inner drive that urges them on.

The very facts which Mr. Schapiro presents, can, however, be read differently and, one may add, with a more plausible explanation. Lenin's flexibility in matters of theory, his disposition to jettison principles whenever practical needs required it, his propensity to beat down his opponents with one idea and to adopt the opposite one after their defeat, — all this spells to Mr. Schapiro method without doctrine. To this reviewer it means that Communism is shot through and through with doctrine, but doctrine that consists of several layers of which the top ones are meant to be flexible rules of expediency, while direction and strength are drawn from the unchanging fundamentals. Among these fundamentals we must count above all the concept of the dialectic of History and the appointment of the Communist Party to the role of chief executor of History's will. Among them are also found the doctrine of supreme authority by virtue of "correct consciousness," the primacy of political will over "mechanistic" economic evolution, and the utter relativity of all values and ideas in the struggle for political power. It is by virtue of this doctrine, which he laid down as early as 1902, that Lenin identifies himself with the Revolution. He is the dialectician-king whose dictatorial power has been

absolutely hallowed by the goddess of History, who alone knows her will, and who leads the Party that is the wave of the future. It is by virtue of doctrine that he is both unswervingly dogmatic and boundlessly flexible: dogmatic as one who has firmly cast the anchor of his mind and will into the ground of the Communist future, flexible as one who knows no obligation to the present except to use it for the purpose of building Communist power. And it is through this combination of fundamentalism with relativism that Lenin defeats his opponents, — or rather that his opponents defeat themselves. To the degree to which they sympathize with the fundamental outlook of Communism, possibly even admire the Communists' utter devotion, their will-to-resist is paralyzed. And to the extent to which their revolutionary fundamentalism imposes on them obligations to obey principle in the present, they not only tie their own hands but also fail again and again to gauge Communist hostile maneuvers. This interpretation accords with all the facts which Mr. Schapiro reports about the defeat of the Mensheviks, the Social Revolutionaries, and the other forces opposing the Central Committee in those years. In view of his correct observations of fact, it is hard to understand why he fails to grasp the decisive role which is played in all these struggles by the Communist doctrines as formulated by Lenin. It is precisely this doctrine which renders Communism the most dangerous, because intellectually most compelling, enemy mankind has ever known.

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BAUER, RAYMOND A.; INKELES, ALEX; AND KLUCKHOHN, CLYDE. *How the Soviet System Works. Cultural, Psychological and Social Themes*. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1956. 274 pp. \$4.75.

The Russian Research Center of Harvard University, commissioned by the United States Air Force, completed in 1955 a five-year study of the Soviet social system. The main source material for the study were questionnaires and interviews with former Soviet citizens of various professions and occupations and of many nationalities of the U.S.S.R. Two-thirds were interrogated in West Germany and Austria, one-third in the United States. The enormous bulk of the material exceeds 33,000 pages and consists of 12,500 questionnaires, 500 oral interviews, 329 extensive life-history interviews, and tons of clinical psychological tests.

The presence of thousands of displaced persons outside of the Iron Curtain provided the opportunity to investigate the living conditions, the feelings, and reactions of the people of the U.S.S.R. The book is dedicated to those people who made the study possible.

Scholars have used parts of this material for special studies. A general final report of the investigation was ready in 1954 and was to be published in 1955 under the title: *Strategic Psychological Strengths and Vulnerabilities of the Soviet Social System*. The book under review is a revised popular presentation of this report. It is supplied with "foot-notes required to bring references to the contemporary Soviet scene up to date."

Economic and political matters were not considered in the plan of

the project but inevitably one could not neglect such subjects as industry, agriculture, planning, and forced labor, as these were necessarily connected with social problems.

The interrogative form of the title of this book, *How the Soviet System Works* is substantiated by the subtitle, *Cultural, Psychological and Social Themes*. But the aim of the study, as we see, was not the system itself, but rather the people: how they live, feel, react, and judge the regime.

Besides a short introduction explaining the project and the conclusions with some forecasts, the book consists of three main parts. "The Operating Characteristics of the Soviet System" (Part II) illustrates "the way the Soviet system actually works," such as: "created myths," planning, terror, etc. These are, rather, the applied methods of Bolshevik policy, not "ways of Soviet society." This part also presents some important aspects of the climate, and the conditions in which the Soviet people live.

The third part, "The Individual in Soviet Society," summarizes the findings about the Soviet citizen under the Bolshevik rule: his satisfactions and dissatisfactions, the attitudes toward the Soviet system and toward the West, his political loyalty. A chapter of this part deals with "some aspects of Russian national character." The purpose here was to investigate the changes caused by the different conditions before and after the Revolution, the Bolshevik scheme for creating a new Soviet man and to compare the Bolshevik ideal with the Russian national character.

This part contains interesting psychological and social data about the

Russian character, the differences between various social groups, and contrasts between Russians and Americans. The comparison between the Bolshevik ideal and the Russian character is indefinite: "there is a poor fit" and "equally correct," "an excellent negative fit" (p. 142).

Interesting and significant is the paragraph—"Aspirations—the ideal society" in chapter 15 (p. 119 ff.) which summarizes the viewpoint of former Soviet citizens: "A strong central government is assumed to give the nation direction and purpose, to provide the stimulus for improvement and advancement, and to make possible the economic features of the welfare state which are so strongly desired. Such a government must have the characteristics of a just but benevolent father . . . The government must look after the needs of the people . . . that morality is maintained . . . if a government has these characteristics, it should be honored, obeyed, loved, and respected . . . Such a good government is by definition a legal and right government, and one need not bother too much about fine points of law and the observance of fixed rules and regulations . . . Government should, of course, be representative and probably elective, but largely in the sense indicated above, i.e., it is more important that it should respond to the wishes of the people than that it should be selected by them. If it is a good government, paternal, nurtural, friendly, and helpful, political parties and factions have no special place or meaning, although its right to govern should be periodically affirmed by a demonstration ballot . . ."

In connection with these state-

ments it seems noteworthy to recall the debate between the Slavophiles and the Westerners in the forties of the last century. The Slavophiles pretended to discover among the Russian peasants a similar traditional, patriarchal attitude toward the government. K. S. Aksakov wrote in 1849: "The people accepted the government and will keep and respect it . . . From both sides there should be a complete trust . . . But we are asked—'Is there a guarantee?' No guarantee is necessary. Guarantee is an evil . . ." The authors do not make this comparison, but it is a discovery of the study.

The hostile attitude of the peasantry to collective farming is fully confirmed. The study asserts that not only the peasants but the entire population of the U.S.S.R. has the same attitude (p. 116). On the other hand "representatives of all social groups exhibit virtual unanimity in approval of state ownership of heavy industry and related economic enterprises. Centralized economic planning is also agreed upon." The judgment about state ownership of light industry (consumer goods) is "about evenly split, non-manual groups predominantly opposed."

The fourth part is devoted to a description of the status, work, and attitudes to the regime of the four most important groups: the ruling elite, the intelligentsia, the peasants, and the workers. About 10,000 people in the party, the bureaucracy, industry, police, and the armed forces compose the ruling elite. The authors include in the important group of the intelligentsia "people in the technical, responsible administrative, professional and related activities, regardless of

formal education, as well as the well-educated (high school, college), regardless of occupation." One may note that this broad conception of the group differs basically from the idea of the intelligentsia in pre-revolutionary Russia. Moreover, in Soviet Russia "the member of the intelligentsia is subject to closer surveillance than is the rank-and-file citizen . . ." "The life situation of the Soviet intelligentsia is more satisfactory than that of any other group . . ."

The chapter, "Nationality Groups," (pp. 197-208, is very informative. It presents the problem in a sequence of details. National minority groups, about half the total population, have relatively less power than the dominant stock because of personal participation in the State administration, internal frictions, and the Russification policies.

A word of caution is added regarding the minorities abroad. There are some self-appointed "professional" nationalists who represent exile groups with intense in-group sentiments. These individuals tend to report not things as they *are*, but as they *were*, or ought to be. But, as a whole, the authors conclude: "The individual's nationality appears to play a lesser role in determining his attitudes toward the regime than has often been supposed." (pp. 217-218).

The concluding chapter, "Some Forecasts," discusses different possibilities as to the future of the Bolshevik state. The system will not remain without change, but the changes, we are told, "will be evolutionary, rather than revolutionary." The coming evolution could take "one of the following main directions or some specific com-

bination of them:" 1) reversion to Stalinism; 2) increased bureaucratization and the rise of the non-party managerial technicians; 3) return to "certain traditional (pre-Soviet) Russian patterns with strong development of Russian or Pan-Slavic nationalism and imperialism"; 4) "a gradual movement . . . to stable . . . accommodation with the West."

This variety of possible changes reminds one of the proverbial Russian weather forecast: "It will rain, it will snow; maybe yes, or maybe no." The keystone of the whole Bolshevik system is the one-party rule, strictly guarded, inviolable and sacred. It would appear that as long as this basic condition of the Bolshevik state prevails no changes in Soviet politics could be fundamental. But once free elections could be held, the Bolshevik domination over Russia will come to an end.

Based on vital source-material provided by thousands of former Soviet citizens, the volume under review should be of great help to all students of the U.S.S.R.

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DEWITT, NICHOLAS. *Soviet Professional Manpower; Its Education, Training, and Supply*. National Science Foundation, U. S. Printing Office, Washington, D. C., 1955. 400 pp., paper-bound, \$1.25.

We are living in an era of profound technological changes in all fields of human activities. Quantitative and qualitative problems of professional manpower become, thus, of paramount importance for the development of society. The knowledge of the size, composition,

and technical level of professional cadres of any modern country is today quite indispensable for a better understanding of its development and for the appraisal of its actual and potential strength. This is all the more true for the Soviet Union where large professional cadres were created in a relatively short time and the development of technology is furthered as in no other country in the world.

This work has grown out of Nicholas DeWitt's years of study, under the auspices of the Russian Research Center of Harvard University and material gathered independently by Boris I. Gorokhoff, Head of Slavic Languages Section, Descriptive Cataloguing Division, Library of Congress, whose unpublished, mimeographed report, "Materials for the Study of Soviet Specialized Education" (1952), was of great help to Mr. DeWitt in the development of this work.

The appearance of DeWitt's study, in spite of some shortcomings mentioned below, is quite an event in the development of American Soviet studies. The author collected, summarized, and presented in clear and concise form a wealth of material from many sources, some of which are difficult to obtain. His analysis is sober, cautious, and generally to the point. His interest is confined not only to educational but also to related sociological problems. In all important aspects the author tries to show Soviet professional education in the light of American educational developments. Finally, the scope of the study is broader than its title: the author covers not only professional education but also, quite rightly, in condensed form, the general setting of the Soviet educational system

and primary and secondary general education in the Soviet Union. The author stresses modestly that in this part of his study "the emphasis is on a factual account of certain developments in education; certain factors which highlight Soviet educational practices will be pointed out only in a cursory fashion" (p. 31). Actually he offers more.

The most difficult task for the author was to estimate Soviet professional education in American terms. Many of his remarks are of great interest, but it cannot be said that he succeeded completely in solving the problem. He gives figures for people graduating from Soviet institutions of higher learning (universities and institutes) and compares them with American figures for people with college-level education (B.A. and B.S. and first professional degrees). This goes through almost the whole book. It may be approximately correct for the first professional degrees (M.D., D.D.S., D.V.M., LL.B.) but decidedly not for the great mass of college graduates (B.A. and B.S.) The author himself stresses that in cases of teachers, veterinarians, and nurses, American college diplomas correspond in the Soviet Union to diplomas of secondary, semi-professional training (p. 70) and not to those of higher educational institutions; that the Soviet university-trained chemist "may be in some instances as well-trained as our M.S. degree chemist" (pp. 113-114; even this seems to be quite an understatement). The whole study shows that in the Soviet-American competition of developing professional manpower the Soviet Union begins to outrun the United States. It is necessary to face this fact squarely and not to tone down the picture.

In a wide study based on incomplete and only relatively reliable material with which a student of Soviet developments has to work, some factual errors are unavoidable. There are also some in the book under review. A few examples may be mentioned; their insignificance speaks well for the high quality of the study as a whole. It is impossible for the factory schools, as the author accepts, to train 16- and 17-year-old boys and girls in six months as skilled workers (p. 14); they train the youth as semi-skilled workers (*rabochi massovykh professii*). It is not true that tuition fees in secondary schools were abolished in 1952-1953 as the author was informed "by a source he considers reliable but who prefers not to be identified" (p. 51). This happened only in 1956. There are some other errors of the same order of magnitude.

More regrettable is the persistent grouping by the author of students and graduates of higher educational institutions in five categories: engineering, agriculture, socio-economic studies, education and health (pp. 108, 177, 181, 221, 224). This excludes many other fields of study — mathematics, natural sciences, philology, philosophy — and leaves the reader somewhat confused.

There are other errors for which the author in no way can be made responsible. These are factual errors based on erroneous material which can be corrected only on the basis of more correct data published later. The recent publication, after almost two decades of silence, of a kind of Soviet statistical abstracts (*Narodnoe Khoziaistvo SSSR*) makes necessary and possible the correction of some of the data in DeWitt's study. The most

important correction may be that of the number of semi-professionals in all fields: the author gives for 1953 the figure of 3,870 to 3,980 thousands (p. 228 and elsewhere). The above-mentioned Soviet statistical reference book gives for July 1, 1955, the figure of 2,949 thousands, for January 1, 1956, that of 3,213 thousands (p. 193). Taking into consideration the great labor which has gone into DeWitt's book, it would be worthwhile if the author would check his data against those in the new Soviet reference book and publish the results in a special journal.

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VAKAR, NICHOLAS P. *Belorussia — The Making of a Nation*. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1956. 297 pp. \$6.50; VAKAR, NICHOLAS P. *A Bibliographic Guide to Belorussia*. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1956. 63 pp. \$2.00; SEDURO, VLADIMIR. *The Belorussian Theater and Drama*. Ed. by E. Lehrman, Foreword by E. Simmons. New York, Research Program on the U.S.S.R., 1955. 517 pp.; NEDASEK, N. *Bolshevism v revoliutsionnom dvizhenii Belorussii*. Munich, Institute for the Study of the U.S.S.R., 1956. 151 pp.; NEDASEK, N. *Bolshevism na putiakh k ustanovleniu kontroli nad Belorussiei*. Munich, Institute for the Study of the U.S.S.R., 1956. 68 pp.; *Belorussian Review*. Munich, Institute for the Study of the U.S.S.R., 1956. Nos. 1 & 2.

Of the various regions of the Soviet Union, Belorussia is one which has remained for many years a step-

child of Western historians. Despite its important geopolitical position, no publications on this part of the U.S.S.R. appeared either in English or in any other Western European language until 1956. The new book by Professor Nicholas Vakar finally fills this gap. While some chapters deal with the early period of Belorussian existence, the major part of the book treats the area's recent development. Before World War I neither Belorussia *per se* nor the Belorussian national movement were extant. Around 1916, however, in Vilno, which at that time was occupied by the Germans, a handful of local politicians attempted to win the Kaiser's support for their plan of detaching Belorussian regions from Russia and placing them under the tutelage of the Reich. Herr von Beckerat, German political adviser on the Ost-Front, dissuaded the *Kaiserlichen Kommando* from aiding this Vilno group. Said von Beckerat: "The Belorussian secessionism, supported by a few local archaeologists and journalists, ought to be considered a local matter of no political consequence." (p. 246). The elections to the Constituent Assembly of 1917 in the unoccupied part of Belorussia confirmed von Beckerat's prognosis. There was neither a secessionist ticket presented, nor a single separatist elected. (p. 97). Even a moderate Belorussian nationalist ticket succeeded in getting less than 27,000 votes. The majority of the voters of this region, populated by some five to six million inhabitants, went mainly to the Russian socialist parties.

Despite this evident lack of enthusiasm and popular support for the Belorussian national cause, the independence of the land was pro-

claimed on March 25, 1918. This was the work of a small group of ambitious members of the local Soviet, who with German approval took advantage of the chaos created by the conclusion of the treaty of Brest-Litovsk and the retreat of the Red Guards.

After that time Belorussian national development made prodigious progress. From 1918 to 1930 both the Poles and the Soviets in their respective regions did their best to eradicate from Belorussian minds all memories of a common Russian origin and culture. In their hands Belorussian nationalism became a tool for the destruction of the last survivals of the Russian empire and Russian spirit, which Poles and Reds considered their greatest enemy. The rapidly growing specter of local nationalism, however, soon frightened its unperceiving sponsors. In the early 1930's the Poles started a new campaign, this time to persuade the Belorussians that they had never been either Russian or Belorussians, but simply Polish. For their part, the Soviets decided to replace the recently created Belorussian national culture by a local variety of the proletarian Marxist culture. These switches in Polish and Soviet politics necessarily resulted not only in destruction of their previous efforts at Belorussianization, but also in systematic persecution of the newly-born local intelligentsia, which paid a heavy toll to the changing moods of its rulers. Forced collectivization and the bacchanalia of the Great Purge of 1937, led by Yezhov, added a particularly ominous aspect to this phase of Belorussian history. The German invasion opened a new era of trial and decimation. Recently published Soviet

statistical data has revealed that in 1956, eleven years after the end of World War II, the population of this unfortunate region is still about 13 percent below the 1939 mark.

The chapters dealing with the events of the last War are the best in Professor Vakar's book. He skillfully, without passion or bias, describes the sinister work of the occupation powers, the intrigues of local fellow travellers, the desperate fight of the partisans, and the indifference of the greatest part of this subjugated population.

The reader gains a definite impression from this book that since 1917 Belorussia has undergone a profound and ineradicable cultural evolution. The recently-created Belorussian culture has taken deep root. This development, however, does not necessarily imply a growth of Belorussian political separatism. Secessionist feeling should have been discouraged by the poverty of natural resources, the war's devastation, and heavy losses of population, but among the Belorussian emigration — at least its most active elements politically — nationalism is growing. It seems to this reviewer, however, that the political attitudes of these emigrants reflects the systematic political training of the war and postwar years and can hardly be considered indicative of the mood of compatriots who remained on their native soil. Mr. Vakar has strong doubts regarding the future of independent Belorussia. He concludes: "the waters are not clear and Belorussia is still in making." (p. 235).

The Bibliographic Guide to Belorussia, a companion volume to *Belorussia—The Making of a Nation* lists over 220 primary and secondary sources used by the author, and

contains invaluable information. It will be impossible for any historian of Belorussia not to base new research on the material or analyses presented by Mr. Vakar. In some cases, however, driven by the desire to display a complete picture of Belorussian nationalism, the author over-emphasizes the side represented by the Belorussian secessionists. Thus the actual historical evolution of the land is colored by the nationalist interpretation: the dividing line between history and the "historical myth" (Mr. Vakar's own expression) is not always clearly drawn.

While Mr. Vakar's work offers a general picture of Belorussian national and cultural transformation, the recently published book by V. Seduro supplements it in the particular field of the Belorussian theater. Mr. Seduro fills more than five hundred pages with inclusive material on the development of Belorussian drama and stage. After some timid and ineffectual attempts in the nineteenth century, the Belorussian theater was created in the early 1920's. Despite Soviet persecutions in the next decade, this young theater grew rich in productions and abundant in artistic talent. Its performances in Moscow and other Russian cities before World War II were a great success with Soviet theater-goers. Mr. Seduro's exhaustive account minimizes the impact of the Russian theater, which at that time had attained the climax of its fame. The study is supplied with a bibliography, indices, notes, and photographs and is the best book yet published in this very specialized field. It deserves the attention of every historian of East European cultural evolution.

The Institute for the Study of the U.S.S.R. in Munich has also participated in research on Belorussia and has recently published some monographs and a special review devoted to the study of Belorussian problems. Of two works by N. Nedasek, *Bolshevism in the Belorussian Revolutionary Movement* is the more interesting. According to the author's conclusions, the revolutionary movement in Belorussia, in which Social Democracy was particularly strong toward the turn of the century, was in the process of disintegration during the years 1907-1916. This observation confirms the supposition that Russian revolutionary forces were severely routed and psychologically undermined by Stolypin's policies, and that the February, 1917 Revolution was more the result of popular dissatisfaction with the war and of the internal weakness of the regime than of the planned operations of the revolutionary parties. Mr. Nedasek's second work is intended primarily to refute some allegations of Soviet historians concerning the role of the Bolshevik party in the October events in Belorussia.

The new *Belorussian Review* covers mainly the happenings of the Soviet period. One of the articles, "The Curzon Line and Territorial Changes in Eastern Europe," will not fail to attract the attention of persons interested in diplomatic history in this area, and it summarizes some rare or widely scattered material.

Though different in nature and scope, all these publications contribute to an understanding of this little-known land, which for so many centuries was the embattled

field of Polish-Russian historical competition.

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TOBIAS, ROBERT. *Communist Christian Encounter in East Europe*. Indianapolis, School of Religion Press, 1956. 568 pp. \$8.00.

This is a contribution to the understanding of one of the phases of the conflict between the West and the East, namely, the religious phase. As the author convincingly shows in one of the most interesting chapters of his work (V), the initial anti-religion of the Communists gradually evolved into a "new scientific religion." The Content of this artificial religion is carefully compared with the basic dogmas of Christianity and is shown to be a kind of parody of the latter. This new religion, thinks the author, poses new problems both for Communism and Christianity. The main problem is whether the Communists are planning eventually to transform the vestiges of Christianity into their new religion, or whether they will continue to struggle against these vestiges until they disappear.

This is, however, only one of the topics discussed in the first part of the book which is entitled "An Interpretation." This interpretation, occupying the first 217 pages, is an attempt to present a historical survey of the Communist attack on religion, both in Russia and in the satellites. It is a bold enterprise, and one may wonder whether it would have been more cautious and profitable to treat as separate topics, Russia as the area of the original attack, and the satellites,

where the experience of the Russian era has been utilized and where anti-religion met with other traditions and other cultural backgrounds. The author himself recognizes "the conditioning influence of confession" (Ch. X), and discusses separately theological developments among the Orthodox Christians and the protestants (Ch. XI). Developments among the Catholics have not been scrutinized.

The interpretative part of the work ends with a group of chapters devoted to "The Church Universal." New tensions among Christians are studied, especially the one caused by the Ecumenical movement which, though unifying in intention, has elicited dissension between those who accept or reject it. Next, the problem of "stand" is discussed, or, what should be the ultimate line beyond which the Churches could not go. Separate answers are given for post-Communist society (where ideological Communism has been subordinated to political expediency), Communist society, pre-Communist society (of which, surprisingly, America has been chosen to serve as an example (is the author sure that the whole world will go Communist?), and secluded society (not really exposed to the Communist danger). The answers are purely theoretical. The last chapter of the "Interpretation" is devoted to "the wholeness of the Church and renewal," which is more a theoretical essay than an account of a phase of the historical encounter of Christianity and Communism.

The second part of the book, entitled "Chronicle" and occupying 350 pages, is divided into chapters corresponding to the individual countries where the encounter stud-

ied has taken place. Each of these particular chronicles consists of excerpts, mainly from secondary sources, namely books and articles in English or German; Russian, Hungarian, and other sources are used only insofar as translations in these languages are available. The number of sources used is surprisingly small. Thus, for instance, the present reviewer's *Religion in Soviet Russia* (1942) is often quoted, but his article in Gurian's symposium, *The Soviet Union*, summarizing in 40-odd pages events from 1942-1950 is ignored; so is John Curtiss' *The Russian Church and the Soviet State* (1953). In general, the Chronicle as well as the interpretation do not go beyond 1950; only occasionally are later events mentioned. Therefore, the reader remains unaware of such important developments as the 1954 upsurge of the anti-religious campaign in the Soviet Union and of the retreat therefrom manifested, among other things, by the numerous invitations extended to Patriarch Alexei and other Church leaders to attend the receptions in honor of foreign guests. It is a pity that R. Tobias has not found it possible to follow up events to the present time, because these years are in general well and reliably covered, and the juxtaposition of evidence offered by various authors is quite useful.

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BABITSKY, PAUL AND RIMBERG, JOHN.
The Soviet Film Industry. New York, Praeger, 1955. 377 pp. \$5.50.

About four years ago, in Times Square, New York, I had occasion to see the Soviet film "Michurin"

at the Stanley Theater. It was a depressing experience. The scenario devoid of any dramatic development, the pompous, improbable dialogue, the stilted, unnatural acting, the primitive dramatic concepts of the director, let alone the dim, faded colors, all this taken together was more than enough to dampen the spirits of the most dauntless movie fan. To sit out "Michurin" to the end proved a veritable torture.

It so happened that a few days later I met a prominent American film director. The conversation turned on the Soviet motion pictures of the twenties. "What excellent films they used to produce then," he said, "how much did we learn from their talented directors! Where are they all today? Why is nothing more heard of them? What has become of Eisenstein? Of Dovzhenko?" I told him what I knew about Eisenstein's fate, but I could tell him nothing about the latter. A memory of Dovzhenko's old films flashed through my mind: the powerful, pathetic "Arsenal"; "Zvenigora" — a strange and charming picture in which ancient Kkrainian legends were interwoven with the theme of the Civil War. Indeed, what had happened to Dovzhenko? I do not know. The fate of this talented director and of his creative work somehow had eluded me.

On that same day, after dark, I was once again riding through Times Square, and suddenly my eye was caught by the subtitle on the "Michurin" poster in front of the theater: "New Masterpiece by Dovzhenko!" So it was Dovzhenko who had created "Michurin" — this miserable propagandist trash!

Nothing could have brought

home to me more vividly the tragedy of the Soviet cinema and its most outstanding representatives. The Soviet government had indeed dealt a deathblow to cinematic art in its country. The wings of the creative fantasy of the best directors had been clipped, and their talents had gone to seed. Only their famous names had been preserved — in the vain attempt to illumine the wretched products of "socialist realism" with the reflected luster of their former glory.

How had it happened, and why?

The book by Babitsky and Rimberg offers the reader a wealth of material on the history of the Soviet cinema. The sections dealing with the history and chronology of the subject is indeed remarkably accurate and of unquestionable value. Most noteworthy in this respect are two chapters: Rimberg's "Central Administration of the Soviet Film Industry, 1917-1953," and Babitsky's "Scenarios and Writers."

Unfortunately, however, the authors have failed to describe lucidly and convincingly the process of the appalling decline of the Soviet cinema as an art form. Moreover, the book is constructed in such a way as to make it difficult for the reader to discover for himself the true causes of that decline. This happened because, for some reason, the artistic and aesthetic aspects of motion-picture production have been disregarded by the authors. Yet, after all, the film industry is essentially nothing more than the foundation that supports the motion-picture art — a very important foundation, of course, but by no means always decisively important.

How often, at international festivals, does a modest, relatively inexpensive picture outshine many a

sumptuous, mammoth film. The poverty-stricken Soviet film industry of the twenties, with its backward techniques, now and again succeeded in producing beautiful pictures which exercised a profound influence upon many eminent directors of the West. The films made by A. Romm influenced René Clair; the first pictures created by Eisenstein and Dovzhenko had a powerful effect on the whole range of the German cinema; Eisenstein's "Thunder Over Mexico" influenced many American directors. This was due to the fact that many Soviet film directors of those years were fired with a true creative enthusiasm and were not afraid of experimenting and of seeking new paths in art. They borrowed their high artistic standards from a kindred art — the magnificent Russian dramatic theater of that period. The history of the Soviet cinema is indissolubly linked with the theater, yet of this no mention is made in the book under review.

As a matter of fact, the process of the decline of the Soviet cinema ran parallel to the catastrophic deterioration of the Soviet dramatic theater both as regards the artistic standard of its actors and the craftsmanship of its directors. This was the inevitable disastrous consequence of two factors: 1. the complete subordination of all subject-matter to the needs of propaganda (in practice, this precluded any truthful representation of real life and of real human beings with their complex relationships and genuine conflicts); 2. the "fight against formalism," which put a curb on the creative imagination of the directors, compelling them to use as their sole means of expression the forms of an old-fashioned,

outworn, pedestrian realism.

The authors of *The Soviet Film Industry* have failed to give due weight to the outstanding successes of the Soviet cinema of the twenties and have presented an utterly unconvincing picture of its gradual degeneration. Many important details of that process have escaped their attention completely. Thus, for instance, Babitsky emphasizes the artistic inadequacy and falsity of the scenario of "Alexander Nevsky" (p. 173), without, however, mentioning the fact that Eisenstein had absolutely nothing to do with it: the scenario was forced upon him from above, and he was strictly forbidden to undertake any changes in the script. In addition, he was provided with two assistants charged with supervising his close adherence to orders—Vasiliev, Stalin's favorite director, the creator of "Chapaev," and Pavlenko, Stalin's favorite writer. This story, as well as many other dramatic incidents of Eisenstein's life, is related in detail in his biography by Marie Seton. Babitsky and Rimberg often refer to this work; in this case, however, references alone are not enough. The authors should have analyzed the material collected by Marie Seton in order to expose its tragic significance.

The work provides abundant material for a history of Soviet cinematography, and for this the authors are to be commended. Unfortunately, the history of Soviet cinematic art itself still remains to be written.

JURI JELACIN

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DE GRUNWALD, CONSTANTIN. *Peter the Great*. Tr. by Viola Garvin. New York, Macmillan, 1956. 224 pp. \$4.50.

Peter the Great has long fascinated biographers and historians of many nationalities from Daniel Defoe and Voltaire to Platonov, Bugoslovsky and, more recently, Lebedev, Andreev, and Spiridonova. Their products have ranged from the frivolous to the ponderous; from the useless to the useful. Interpretations by non-Soviet historians and biographers have changed with passing years as knowledge has increased and perspective improved. Interpretations by Soviet historians have also changed in response to shifts in the Party line. All in all, it would be most difficult for anyone to come up with any really new or startling account of Peter. De Grunwald does not do so.

His interpretation is, by and large, nationalistic and almost adulatory. He is not unaware of the faults and failures of Peter's regime nor of the ruthlessness of his methods, but such matters are dealt with briefly, at least in comparison to the amount of praise bestowed upon Peter. For example, the chapter entitled "The New Capital" devotes fifteen pages to a detailed and rather laudatory description of St. Petersburg and then disposes of what it calls "the other side of the picture" in three pages.

A somewhat similar lack of balance appears elsewhere, and not only as between favorable and unfavorable judgments. As much space is given, for instance, to describing the festivities after his victory at Poltava as to the campaign itself. An almost nostalgic description of Moscow in the early seventeenth century gets as much space

as the "Spiritual Regulation," and more than that given for the economic reforms of Peter.

Now and again, certain contradictions obtrude themselves. Thus de Grunwald declares on one page (175) that Peter's nature was fundamentally Russian and reflected the national character. Yet, four pages later, he declares with equal vigor, "That tendency to indolence, to carelessness, which the Russians probably owed to their nearness to the east, was absolutely contrary to his (i.e., Peter's) nature." (p. 179). This is a little confusing.

It is rather disappointing that, despite numerous quotations and paraphrases, there are no footnotes and no bibliography. Sources are sometimes identified in the text as (for example) "Weber, in his memoirs, has bequeathed to us . . ." or "as Whitworth says" or "recounts M. de Campredon." The historian most often quoted is Miliukov. Other sources are identified even more vaguely as, for example, "Soviet historians," "the Viennese archives," or "contemporary historians." It is therefore impossible to tell, without a tedious examination of internal evidence, precisely what materials M. de Grunwald used (or failed to use) in his research. It is my impression that he depended most heavily upon archival materials, especially diplomat's reports, supplemented by a few standard memoirs and secondary sources.

The book is well-written and entirely readable both as to style and format. Its nine illustrations are well-chosen and interesting. There are no maps. The summary of pre-Petrine Russia — roughly fifty pages — is well calculated to give the flavor of the times, the descrip-

tion of the German quarter being particularly well done. A very great deal more attention is paid to social history than in M. de Grunwald's earlier biography of Nicholas I, but attention remains focussed upon the court and the upper classes. Bulavin's rebellion, for instance, is dismissed in less than a sentence; the popular unrest of that period, in a brief paragraph.

Peter the Great, though packed with interesting detail on social norms of the tangible sort — housing, clothing, food, fashions, and social behavior — is superficial rather than profound. It gives the major outlines of Peter's life and career and embellishes this with factual or impressionistic reports by Peter's contemporaries. Perhaps the book's greatest value lies in its recording of how Peter looked to some of those who watched him in action.

WARREN B. WALSH

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MEIJER, J. M. *Knowledge and Revolution. The Russian Colony in Zurich (1870-1873). A Contribution to the Study of Russian Populism*. Amsterdam, Assen, 1955. 230 pp. Fl. 15.; PYZIUR, EUGENE. *The Doctrine of Anarchism of Michael A. Bakunin*. Marquette Slavic Studies I, Milwaukee, 1955. 158 pp. \$3.00.

To the growing literature on Russian socialist and revolutionary thought, all out of proportion to its real influence, the International Institute for Social History at the University of Amsterdam has added this study which bears all the earmarks of a doctoral dissertation. Frankly, it is disappointing, mostly

because it does not deal with its principal theme — the Russian students at the University of Zurich and their contribution to the Populist movement (probably because neither enough material could be found about it nor the lives of the students traced after their return to Russia) but with the squabbles among Bakunin, Nechaev, and Lavrov and their respective followers, about which much has already been written.

The author paints a sorry picture of petty jealousies, intrigues, mutual invectives and even physical fights in the life of revolutionaries and would-be revolutionaries in Zurich. He does not appear to realize how damaging it is to his thesis since his sympathies are obviously on their side. The young men and women, mostly from the southern and southwestern provinces of Russia, who went to Switzerland to obtain an education, soon discarded their lofty aims and plunged into factional and personal strife under the pretense of being revolutionaries. It would have been more fitting to entitle this study: "A little knowledge is a dangerous thing."

Although the author acknowledges the help of some distinguished persons, including Professor and Mrs. E. H. Carr, not only in factual matters but also in the English translation of the study, a more careful proof-reading as to language would have avoided such mistakes as, "conspiracy" for conspiracy (p. 19), "chemic" instead of "chemist" (p. 49), "pope" instead of priest (pp. 50, 51), "Krim" instead of Crimea (p. 169), "Students in Zurich abhorred from Nechaev" (p. 63), "his contacts to these persons" (p. 86), or "Liberal tendencies were strong at that time

and Markovich opposed these with all his forces" (p. 55), when the author, judging from the context, wanted to say just the opposite. The author also erroneously translates "raznochintsy" as people of non-noble descent (p. 7), instead of belonging to no class, "krestiyane" as "christened property" (p. 9), instead of peasants; he misquotes the peasants' saying: "the land is ours, but we are the tsar's" (p. 11) instead of: "we are yours [i.e., the landowner's], and the land is ours." Furthermore, the statements: "Probably Karakozov was tortured several times (p. 27), and "The period immediately after the attempt became known as the White Terror" (p. 28) are not based on any historical evidence.

Last but not least, in a fairly extensive bibliography the author fails to include such important studies as Helène Izwolski: *La vie de Bakounine*, Paris, 1930, and M. Karpovich: "A Forerunner of Lenin: P. N. Tkachev, *Review of Politics*, July, 1944.

To the long list of works on and about Bakunin, available in Russian, German, French, Italian, and English, is now added *The Doctrine of Anarchism of Michael A. Bakunin* by a Ukrainian scholar who re-examines not so much the actions as the thought of the fiery Russian. One wonders whether it was necessary, since the author himself admits that today Bakunin's anarchism is dead (p. 43), and that his doctrine was both contradictory (p. 21) and inconsistent (p. 63). Bakunin, of course, was first and foremost, a rebel, a spiritual descendant of Razin, Bolot-

nikov, and Pugachev. Herzen called him: "A man of talent, but a scoundrel" and the author states that "he sought either submissive followers or foes" (p. 23). Yet the author, carried away by his subject, expresses the opinion that "his revolutionary performance was unprecedented" (p. 1), that he had "extraordinary political foresight" (p. 8), and that he has "phenomenal historical significance" (p. 14), notwithstanding the fact that Bakunin's revolutionary activity led to nothing, that the present turmoil of the world (which may be called anarchism as opposed to the rule of law) was in no way predicted by Bakunin, and that he was more notorious than famous. As to the author's main thesis that "a Bolshevik revolution was needed to expose the true meaning of Bakunin's teaching" since "the techniques of this revolution were those proposed by Bakunin" (p. 147), this reviewer cannot accept, because it is rather the technique of infiltration through political cells, as advocated by Nechaev, that produced the Bolshevik revolution.

But the book is readable and devoid of historical mistakes. This reviewer found only one: S. Ralli, one of Bakunin's followers, was not "a Russian émigré" (p. 16) but a Rumanian. It will make profitable reading for one who wants a well-documented, up-to-date, yet popular presentation of Bakunin's anarchism. It is unfortunate that this work, too, excludes from its bibliography Helène Izwolski's *La vie de Bakounine*.

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Book Notices

BLACK, C. E. (Ed.) *Rewriting Russian History: Soviet Interpretations of Russia's Past*. Published for the Research Program on the U.S.S.R. New York, Praeger, 1956. 413 pp. \$7.50.

Professor Black has skillfully put together twelve essays written by seven different authors, including himself. Four of the essays are general, dealing with periodization, the individual, the "lesser evil" formula, and the relation of history and politics in the U.S.S.R. In the latter (which is actually the introductory essay) Professor Black provides the framework of the study. Mr. Leo Yaresh is the author of the essays on the problem of periodization and the role of the individual. Both essays are specific in a topical sense but general in the sense of not being confined to a particular period. "The 'Lesser Evil' Formula," written by Professor Shteppa, discusses the theme that Russian annexation of various national groups was a lesser evil than might otherwise have befallen them.

Part Two, subtitled "The Application of Theory: Selected Examples," consists of eight essays on specific and limited topics. Professor Vucinich discusses "The First Russian State"; Professor Sevchenko, "Byzantine Cultural Influences"; Mr. Varlamov, "Bakunin and the Russian Jacobins and Blanquists"; and Mr. J. M. Thompson, "Allied and American Intervention in Russia, 1918-1921." Professor Black contributed an essay on Peter the

Great's reforms, and Mr. Yaresh is represented by three essays—"The Formation of the Great Russian State," "Ivan the Terrible and the Oprichina," and "The Campaign of 1812."

It would be gratuitous to single out one or two for special mention. Each reader will have his own favorite or favorites on the basis of special interest in a topic or of preference as to style. All of the essays are professional and workmanlike.

W. W.

KUZNETSOV, B. M. *For the Benefit of Stalin*. New York, Voennyy Vestnik, 125 pp.

According to some accounts there were in Germany, at the end of World War II, some ten million refugees from the Soviet Union. They were prisoners of war, civilians taken to the Reich as laborers, and those who fled Soviet Russia with the retreating Germans. In accordance with the Yalta agreement the bulk of these refugees (the exact number will never be known) were repatriated to the Soviet Union. Thousands committed suicide resisting repatriation and those who were delivered were either shot or sent to concentration camps.

This pamphlet is a collection of documents largely written by the victims themselves. It includes letters and appeals addressed by them to the Allied authorities, Mr. Churchill, Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt,

and the International Red Cross. There are also some army orders regarding repatriation, as well as answers of the American authorities to the appeals of the victims. Although limited, this material should be useful for a fully documented history of repatriation.

I. S.

LEDNICKI, WACŁAW. *Pushkin's Bronze Horseman*. Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1955. 163 pp. \$2.50.

This book is an enlargement of the author's Polish monograph "Jézdziec Miedziany A. Pushkina" (1932). The purpose of this work is "to produce a work of a more general orientation." The author emphasizes the ambiguity of the poem: who was right, the powerful builder of the Russian Empire, or one of the poor victims of Nature and History, Eugene? The poem is rather convincingly linked with Pushkin's short poem "Oh Lord, Don't Let Me Go Out of My Mind," in which the poet "suddenly realized that his position was not far removed from the tragedy of Eugene." The most interesting chapter is perhaps the third, on Pushkin, Mickiewicz, and Falconet—the creator of the bronze horseman. It is a pity that the author has not made use of several recent works on Pushkin, notably George Fedotov's essays (included in the *Novyi Grad*, 1952), Marina Tsveteva's essay in *Russkie Zapiski*, II, 1937, and G. Adamovich's and P. Bitsilli's articles in *Sovremennye Zapiski*, vol. 63, 1937.

G. I.

PETROV, VLADIMIR AND EVDOKIA. *Empire of Fear*. New York, Praeger, 1956. 351 pp. \$5.00.

In 1954 Vladimir Petrov, Third Secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Canberra, Australia, and a Colonel in the security police, asked for political asylum and revealed an espionage ring in Australia. His wife, a captain of the security police at the same embassy, was on the point of being taken back to Moscow, but at the last moment decided also to seek asylum in Australia.

The authors describe not only their activities as Soviet functionaries but also their own feelings and attitudes to life in Russia and abroad. This is of particular importance since the circles in which the Petrovs moved comprised mainly security agents who thought and acted along similar lines. The Petrovs' views are, therefore, typical of the Soviet "middle elite," a large group composed mostly of Party members who enjoy special privileges and are undoubtedly devoted to the Soviet regime. Throughout the book the authors stress the meaning of fear in Soviet life—fear of losing one's life, one's position and privileges. The book has many interesting details of Soviet life and history. The information, for example, about Radek's death is quite new. The authors sound a warning to those émigrés who are thinking of returning to their native land and cite as evidence the case of the pilot Borzov who sought asylum and later returned to the Soviet Union, only to be shot.

I. S.

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
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